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Courts have recently abandoned the centuries-old practice of con-
struing fair use as an issue of fact for the jury. Fair use now stands as an 
issue of law for the judge. This change is threatening traditional con-
tours of copyright law that protect fair-use speech. Courts, then, must 
reform their current construction of fair use by returning to its origins—
fair use as a factual matter for the jury. Yet even if courts do construe 
fair use as a matter of fact, the question remains whether courts should 
ever decide fair use as a matter of law. To answer this question, I exam-
ine whether appellate courts should ever review fair use under a de novo 
standard and whether trial courts should ever decide fair use on sum-
mary judgment. I conclude that both appellate and trial courts should 
decide fair use as a matter of law under specific circumstances: appel-
late courts should review constitutional findings under a de novo stand-
ard only where a bench trial occurs or where a jury verdict favors the 
copyright holder; trial courts should rule on summary judgment only in 
favor of fair users. In short, ruling as a matter of law must serve the 
speech-protective function of fair use. Fair use as a matter of law must 
favor fair users. 
INTRODUCTION 
A few decades ago, courts rarely determined the issue of fair use as 
a matter of law.
1
 Upholding two centuries of common-law precedent, 
courts recognized that the issue of fair use “raise[s] essentially factual 
issues and . . . are normally questions for the jury.”
2
 Even the “slightest 
doubt” as to whether a use was fair precluded trial courts from ruling 
summarily on the issue.
3
 Likewise, appellate courts always deferred to 
  
 † Associate Professor of Law, University of Arkansas. I appreciate the helpful comments on 
a previous draft of this article from Professors Eugene Volokh, Stephen Sheppard, Edward Lee, and 
Laura Gasaway. I further acknowledge helpful comments by the participants at the Fourth Annual 
Junior Scholars in Intellectual Property Workshop, held at Michigan State University College of 
Law. Finally, I am grateful for the excellent work of my research assistant, Michael Thompson. 
 1. E.g., DC Comics, Inc. v. Reel Fantasy, Inc., 696 F.2d 24, 28 (2d Cir. 1982) (reversing 
district court’s grant of summary judgment on the grounds that fair use raises “essentially factual 
issues and . . . are normally questions for the jury”); see also Ned Snow, Judges Playing Jury: Con-
stitutional Conflicts in Deciding Fair Use on Summary Judgment, 44 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 483, 518–
28 (2010). 
 2. DC Comics, 696 F.2d at 28; Sayre v. Moore, (1785) 1 East 361, 362 (K.B.) (Lord Mans-
field, C.J.) (“In all these [copyright cases where defendant had altered underlying work], the ques-
tion of fact to come before a jury is, whether the alteration be colourable or not? . . . [T]he jury will 
decide whether it be a servile imitation or not.”); Snow, supra note 1, at 518–22 (tracing history of 
common law courts placing issue of fair use with jury). 
 3. See Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468, 472–73 (2d Cir. 1946). 
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trial findings on fair use, employing a clear error standard of review.
4
 




Today everything has changed. Most trial courts treat fair use as a 
pure issue of law, so even where reasonable minds might disagree, the 
judge determines the issue on summary judgment.
6
 Rarely does the issue 
ever see a jury.
7
 And in reviewing a trial court’s ruling on fair use, appel-
late courts usually rule as a matter of law, applying a de novo standard.
8
 
For all practical purposes, fair use now stands as an issue of law for 
judges to decide.
9
 The change could not have been more blatant. It was 
unnecessary, unsubstantiated, and unconstitutional.
10
 
In previous work, I argued that fair use should be construed as a fact 
issue for the jury.
11
 Both the Constitution and sound policy, I argued, 
mandate that fair use return to its factual origins.
12
 Unsurprisingly, my 
argument was met with skepticism.
13
 Commentators raised questions 
about the seeming implications of denying judges the opportunity to de-
cide fair use as a matter of law: Doesn’t my argument imply that I am 
also proposing to do away with de novo review?
14
 Wouldn’t this mean 
  
 4. See, e.g., MCA, Inc. v. Wilson, 677 F.2d 180, 183 (2d Cir. 1981) (“Since the issue of fair 
use is one of fact, the clearly erroneous standard of review is appropriate.” (citations omitted)); 
Eisenschiml v. Fawcett Publ’ns, Inc., 246 F.2d 598, 604 (7th Cir. 1957). 
 5. See Snow, supra note 1, at 518–28. 
 6. E.g., Castle Rock Ent’mt v. Carol Publ’g Grp., Inc., 955 F. Supp. 260, 272 (S.D.N.Y. 
1997) (deciding fair use on summary judgment despite recognizing that the reasonableness of con-
trary inferences which made the court’s “decision a difficult one”), aff’d, 150 F.3d 132 (2d Cir. 
1998); Television Digest, Inc. v. U.S. Tel. Ass’n, 841 F. Supp. 5, 9 (D.D.C. 1993) (rejecting argu-
ment that fair use may not be decided on motion for summary judgment); see also Snow, supra note 
1, at 532–35. 
 7. See, e.g., Compaq Computer Corp. v. Ergonome Inc., 387 F.3d 403, 410–11 (5th Cir. 
2004) (upholding jury verdict on issue of fair use). 
 8. See, e.g., Wall Data Inc. v. L.A. Cnty. Sheriff's Dept., 447 F.3d 769, 777 (9th Cir. 2006) 
(“We also review de novo the district court’s finding of fair use under the Copyright Act . . . .”); 
Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811, 817 (9th Cir. 2003) (declaring that a district court’s finding 
of fair use is reviewed under a de novo standard, and that this review entails balancing the four fair–
use factors); Nihon Keizai Shimbun, Inc. v. Comline Bus. Data, Inc., 166 F.3d 65, 72 (2d Cir. 1999) 
(“[W]e review the district court’s rejection of a fair-use defense de novo, although we will uphold its 
subsidiary findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous.”). However, in a relatively few instanc-
es, some appellate decisions have continued to apply a clear error standard where a jury has deter-
mined the issue. See, e.g., Compaq, 387 F.3d at 410–11; Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. UMG Recordings, 
Inc., 585 F.3d 267, 277–78 (6th Cir. 2009). 
 9. See L.A. News Serv. v. Reuters Television Int’l, Ltd., 149 F.3d 987, 993 (9th Cir. 1998) 
(interpreting caselaw as “rejecting [the] argument that fair use is appropriate for determination by 
summary judgment only when no reasonable jury could have decided the question differently” 
(citing Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432, 436 (9th Cir. 1986)); see also Snow, supra note 1, at 532–35.  
 10. In another article, I explain the constitutional and policy reasons that demand judicial 
construction of fair use as an issue of fact. See Snow, supra note 1, at 497–518, 544–55. 
 11. Id. at 493–518. 
 12. Id. at 497–518, 544–55. 
 13. E.g., Ben Sheffner, Article Criticizes Deciding Fair Use on Summary Judgment; Gertner 
Exhibited ‘Class Favortism’ Toward ‘Large Corporations’ in Fair Use Ruling, COPYRIGHTS & 
CAMPAIGNS BLOG (Aug. 29, 2009, 9:55 AM), 
http://copyrightsandcampaigns.blogspot.com/2009/08/article-criticizes-deciding-fair-use-on.html. 
 14. See id. 
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that appellate courts could no longer teach principles to clarify the ever-
muddled doctrine of fair use?
15
 Wouldn’t my proposal hurt fair users—
the party I’m trying to help—because it would deny them the ability to 
prevail quickly on summary judgment, without incurring the cost of a 
jury trial?
16
 These and other genuine questions seemed to plague the ar-
gument that fair use should be construed as it had been for two centu-
ries—as a factual matter for the jury. 
In this Article, I take up these questions surrounding whether fair 
use may ever be decided as a matter of law, even while construing it as a 
matter of fact. I discuss the implications of classifying fair use in the 
context of appellate review and motions for summary judgment, consid-
ering the effect on speech interests of fair users and copyright holders, 
along with policy considerations regarding certainty and fairness. I ulti-
mately conclude that the factual classification of fair use for a jury does 
not preclude a court from deciding the issue as a matter of law under de 
novo review or on summary judgment, but only in specific circumstanc-
es. I propose that the standard of review should always favor fair users, 
such that de novo should govern where copyright holders prevail at trial, 
whereas clear error should govern where fair users prevail. I further pro-
pose that at trial, judges should rule on summary judgment only in favor 
of fair users; they should rule for copyright holders on summary judg-
ment in the rarest of circumstances, if at all. I thus propose a double 
standard of review and a one-sided application of summary judgment—
all favoring the defendant fair user. 
Part I briefly provides a background of fair use and defines the is-
sues under consideration in the fair-use analysis—inferences that arise 
from applying legal principles to historical facts. Part II sets forth the 
history that both contravenes and resulted in the present mistaken state of 
the law. Parts III and IV set forth my proposal to undo this mistake. Both 
Parts rely on the fundamental premise that fair use should be a factual 
matter, and this premise I examine in my previous article.
17
 Part III ad-
dresses the implications of that premise for appellate courts and Part IV 
for trial courts.  
I. GENERAL BACKGROUND OF FAIR USE 
As a limit on copyright, the doctrine of fair use protects those per-
sons who use another’s expression without permission but in a fair man-
  
 15. See email from Eugene Volokh, Gary T. Schwartz Professor of Law, UCLA Sch. of Law, 
to Ned Snow, Assoc. Professor of Law, University of Ark. Sch. of Law (April 16, 2010, 18:39 CST) 
(on file with author) (questioning whether it is wise to construe fair use as a factual jury issue given 
that it would result in less predictability in the law). 
 16. I thank Professor Ed Lee, Director of the Program in Intellectual Property Law at Chica-
go-Kent College of Law, for this good question, which he brought to my attention at the Fourth 
Annual Junior Scholars in Intellectual Property Workshop. 
 17. Snow, supra note 1, at 497–554. 
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18
 Deciding what is fair can be difficult and complex, often turning 
on circumstances unique to each case.
19
 Fair use thus lacks a precise def-
inition or test that would fit all situations: it is instead intended to be flex-
ible, able to contemplate all factual circumstances that could possibly 
justify a particular use of the expression.
20
 
Owing to the absence of a precise definition or test, the doctrine of 
fair use follows general principles that guide the analysis of determining 
fairness.
21
 The Federal Copyright Act sets forth four factors that reflect 
common law principles of fair use that have arisen over two hundred 
years of judicial consideration.
22
 The four factors are non-exhaustive and 
discretionary in application: any one factor may weigh more heavily than 
another, and other factors not listed in the Act may be considered as 
well.
23
 The first factor examines the purpose and character of the use, 
which usually includes an examination into whether the use has trans-
formed the original work and whether the use serves a non-commercial 
purpose.
24
 The second factor examines the nature of the copyrighted 
work:
25
 works of a more creative nature tend against a finding of fairness 
and works of a more factual nature tend toward a finding of fairness.
26
 
The third factor examines the amount and substantiality of the work 
used.
27
 The fourth factor examines the effect that the use has on the value 
of, or a potential market for, the copyrighted work.
28
 
The legal principles underlying these four factors must be applied to 
the factual circumstances of a case. Those factual circumstances courts 
often label as historical facts, also called subsidiary or evidentiary facts.
29
 
Applying the four factors to the historical facts produces inferences that 
suggest whether a use is fair.
30
 All inferences must be weighed against 
  
 18. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006). 
 19. See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 588 (1985) (“The 
endless variety of situations and combinations of circumstances that can arise in particular cases 
precludes the formulation of exact rules in the [fair-use] statute.”). 
 20. See id.; Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 577 (1994). 
 21. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 576–78. 
 22. See 17 U.S.C. § 107. The Act does not specify who is to make this determination—judge 
or jury. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. § 107(1); Campbell, 510 U.S. at 578–79. 
 25. 17 U.S.C. § 107(2). 
 26. Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 237 (1990). 
 27. 17 U.S.C. § 107(3). 
 28. Id. § 107(4). 
 29. See, e.g., Nihon Keizai Shimbun, Inc. v. Comline Bus. Data, Inc., 166 F.3d 65, 72 (2d Cir. 
1999) (explaining that “subsidiary findings of fact” in fair-use analysis are to be reviewed for clear 
error); Fitzgerald v. CBS Broad., Inc., 491 F. Supp. 2d 177, 183–84 (D. Mass. 2007) (drawing dis-
tinction between “historical facts” and interpretation of those facts in fair use analysis). 
 30. For instance, applying the first factor to the situation where a person copies excerpts from 
an author’s book for the purpose of critically reviewing the book yields a possible inference that the 
copying has transformed the copied expression: the copier’s critical analysis potentially casts the 
copied expression in a new light, and thereby potentially transforms the copied expression. See 17 
U.S.C. § 107 (listing criticism as example of fair use); Campbell, 510 U.S. at 592 (noting likely 
fairness of critical review). 
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each other, with the weight of any one inference depending on all other 
inferences drawn.
31
 Together, these inferences must produce an affirma-
tive or negative answer to the question of fairness. The question of 
whether a use is fair thus requires a person to apply legal principles to 
factual circumstances, weigh the resultant inferences, and arrive at a sin-
gular determination.  
II. HISTORY: FROM FACT TO LAW 
The judicial change in classification of fair use from an issue of fact 
to an issue of law is apparent only with a correct understanding of the 
three-step process involved in the fair-use analysis. The first step is as-
certaining the evidentiary facts.
32
 Those evidentiary facts—also called 
historical facts—comprise facts that speak to what actually happened.
33
 
They may be objectively determined directly from the evidence.
34
 For 
instance, the following question raises an issue of evidentiary fact: What 
use did the defendant make of the copyrighted expression?
35
 Such ques-
tions indisputably lie within the domain of the jury as an issue of fact.
36
 
On this point, judges agree.
37
 
The second step in the fair-use analysis occurs when a person draws 
inferences from the evidentiary facts.
38
 When I refer to drawing infer-
ences, I mean the process of applying legal principles to evidentiary 
facts, or in other words, making judgments that have legal significance.
39
 
In the fair-use analysis, such inferences suggest the fairness or unfairness 
of a use.
40
 For instance, the following questions require a person to draw 
inferences from the underlying facts: Is the defendant’s use of the copy-
righted expression transformative?; What is the nature of the copyright-
ed work?
41
 Both of these questions require the drawing of inferences 
based on the evidentiary facts, as does each of the fair-use factors. This 
  
 31. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 577–78, 590–91. In the example of copying excerpts from a book 
for a critical review, see supra note 30, although that circumstance might yield an inference that the 
use is transformative, that inference might not weigh much in the overall analysis if, for instance, 
further inferences arose under the third and fourth factors that the copied portion constituted the 
most substantial portion of the book and that consumers purchased the critical review as a substitute 
for purchasing the original work. Cf. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 
539, 564–66 (1985) (rejecting argument that reporting newsworthy expression constituted fair use on 
grounds that defendant used “heart” of copyrighted work). 
 32. See Snow, supra note 1, at 491–92. 
 33. See id.; see also Nihon Keizai Shimbun, Inc., 166 F.3d at 72; Fitzgerald, 491 F. Supp. 2d 
at 183–84. 
 34. See Snow, supra note 1, at 492 (suggesting that fair use be judged based on the degree to 
which it adds something new to the original work). 
 35. See id. 
 36. See 3 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 12.10[A] 
(2011). (supporting the proposition that issues of historical fact are questions of fact for the jury). 
 37. See Snow, supra note 1, at 492–93. 
 38. See id. at 493–94 (discussing the resolution of inferences that arise during a fair-use 
analysis). 
 39. See id. at 494. 
 40. See id. 
 41. See id. at 493. 
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The third step occurs when a person weighs the inferences so as to 
arrive at a negative or affirmative conclusion regarding whether the use 
is fair.
43
 For instance, How much should the transformative nature of the 
use weigh in the conclusion of fairness? Each situation requires weighing 
each inference on its own merits against all other inferences in the analy-
sis to reach a singular conclusion.
44
 Hence, the fairness (or unfairness) of 
a particular use does not necessarily reflect the same weighing of infer-
ences as any other analysis. 
Courts have treated the latter two steps in the analysis—the infer-
ences and their weighing—as raising the same sort of issues. Some 
courts have treated both these steps as raising only issues of fact for the 
jury, whereas other courts have treated both these steps as raising only 
issues of law for the judge.
45
 The history of this disparate treatment of 
the fair-use inferences and their weight I discuss in the sections below.
46
 
For the sake of simplicity and brevity, in delineating this history I refer to 
the inferences and their weighing as merely the issue of fair use. Techni-
cally, however, my reference to fair use goes to the process of drawing 
inferences and the weighing of those inferences. I point this out only to 
avoid potential confusion regarding the precise issues to which I am re-
ferring. 
With this in mind, I turn to the history. Section A briefly discusses 
the initial period where courts construed fair use as raising a factual is-
sue. Section B examines a pivotal point in the judicial change of constru-
ing fair use: two sentences from a Supreme Court opinion, Harper & 
Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises.
47
 In Section B, I conclude 
that courts misinterpreted these sentences to arrive at the present charac-
terization of fair use as raising an issue of law. 
A. Judicial Treatment over Two Hundred Years  
Principles of fair use in copyright law trace back to English case 
law that is over two-hundred years old.
48
 At that time, in copyright ac-
  
 42. See id. at 491–94 (discussing the factual and legal nature of fair-use inferences). 
 43. See id. at 493–94 (explaining that fair-use inferences and the weight apportioned to each 
determine whether a use is fair). 
 44. See id. 
 45. See id. at 518–35 (comparing the judicial treatment of fair-use inferences as a questions of 
fact or law by various courts). 
 46. See discussion infra Part II (tracing the history of fair-use inferences and their effect on 
the fair-use analysis). 
 47. See 471 U.S. 539, 560 (1985). 
 48. E.g., Cary v. Kearsley, (1802) 170 Eng. Rep. 679, 681 (K.B.) (“I shall address these 
observations to the jury, leaving them to say, whether what so taken or supposed to be transmitted 
from the plaintiff's book, was fairly done with a view of compiling a useful book, for the benefit of 
the public, upon which there has been a totally new arrangement of such matter,—or taken coloura-
ble, merely with a view to steal the copy-right of the plaintiff?”). Many English cases involving 
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tions arising in courts of law, judges would reserve for juries the question 
of whether these principles applied.
49
 That is, early English courts at 
common law reserved the question of fairness for juries. In the United 
States, early fair use cases arose only in equitable proceedings rather than 
as actions at law.
50
 As a result, judges could decide the issue of fair use 
without thought as to whether it existed as an issue of law or fact.
51
 Yet 
even during those equitable proceedings,
52
 influential jurists such as Jus-
tice Joseph Story expressly recognized that, at common law, fair use 
existed as a factual issue for the jury.
53
  
Once the Federal Rules of Civil Procedures came into effect in 
1938, fair use started arising in cases brought as actions at law.
54
 On the 
heels of those first few cases, the Second Circuit clarified the factual 
nature of the fair use issue.
55
 In Arnstein v. Porter,
56
 Judges Hand and 
Frank held that cases involving issues about whether a defendant had 
unlawfully appropriated a copyrighted work were especially inappropri-
ate to decide on summary judgment other than in the most extraordinary 
circumstances, namely, those where there was not even “the slightest 
doubt.”
57
 Decided in 1946, Arnstein influenced judicial treatment of cop-
yright issues, including fair use, for decades to follow.
58
 Through the 
1960s, fair use remained a factual question for which the jury was partic-




principles of fair use arose in courts of equity. WILLIAM F. PATRY, THE FAIR USE PRIVILEGE IN 
COPYRIGHT LAW 3–26 (2d ed. 1995) (tracing the history of fair use). In equity, however, juries do 
not decide issues of fact. 1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE: AS 
ADMINISTERED IN ENGLAND AND AMERICA § 31, at 21 (12th ed. 1877); 2 id. §§ 930–33, at 120–21. 
So, those cases are not relevant in deciding whether English copyright cases treated the issue of 
fairness as factual for a jury to determine. 
 49. Snow, supra note 1, at 518–22; see, e.g., Sayre v. Moore, (1785) 1 East 361, 362 (K.B.) 
(Lord Mansfield, C.J.) (“In all these [copyright cases where defendant had altered underlying work], 
the question of fact to come before a jury is, whether the alteration be colourable or not? . . . [T]he 
jury will decide whether it be a servile imitation or not.”). 
 50. See, e.g., Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 34 F.2d 145, 145 (S.D.N.Y. 1929) (“This is 
a suit for the alleged infringement of a copyright, and the usual injunctive relief with an accounting 
is prayed for.” (emphasis added)), aff’d, 45 F.2d 199 (2d Cir. 1929); Snow, supra note 1, at 523–24 
(explaining reasons that American copyright holders brought copyright suits in equity through mid 
twentieth century). 
 51. See DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES: DAMAGES—EQUITY—RESTITUTION § 2.6(2) 
(1993). 
 52. See 2 STORY, supra note 48, §§ 930–33 at 120–21. 
 53. E.g., Emerson v. Davies, 8 F. Cas. 615, 623–24, (D. Mass. 1845) (No. 4,436) (Story, J.) 
(deciding fair use in equitable proceeding, but characterizing the question of fair use as a “question 
of fact to come to a jury”). 
 54. See Snow, supra note 1, at 524. 
 55. See Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468 (2d Cir. 1946). Although the Arnstein court did 
not specifically employ the words “fair use” to describe the issue of “permissible copying,” the two 
doctrines appear similar in substance, if not distinct in name only. See id. at 472–73. Furthermore, 
the majority relied on the landmark fair use case of Folsom v. Marsh in its analysis. See id. at 472 
n.18. 
 56. 154 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1946). 
 57. See id. at 468. 
 58. See Snow, supra note 1, at 526–28 (reciting the influence of Arnstein on fair-use caselaw). 
 59. See, e.g., Morrissey v. Procter & Gamble Co., 379 F.2d 675, 677 (1st Cir. 1967) (relying 
on Arnstein for the quoted proposition in a copyright suit); Armco Steel Corp. v. Realty Inv. Co., 
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use existed as a fact-intensive inquiry, where inferences in the analysis 
raised issues of fact. Correspondingly, appellate courts applied a clear 
error standard of review, deferring to trial court findings.
60
  
During the 1970s and 1980s, some courts continued to adhere to the 
Arnstein approach of refraining from deciding questions of fair use: trial 
courts refrained from ruling as a matter of law on summary judgment, 
and appellate courts continued to apply a clear error standard of review.
61
 
Other courts, however, departed from the Arnstein approach: some trial 
courts began deciding fair use as a matter of law on summary judgment 
  
273 F.2d 483, 484 (8th Cir. 1960) (relying on Arnstein for the quoted proposition in a breach-of-
contract suit). 
  There were two exceptions recorded to this usual treatment during the 1960s. In Berlin v. 
E.C. Publ’ns, Inc., the copyright holders of popular songs argued that the publishers of Mad Maga-
zine infringed their copyrights by publishing parodies of their songs. 219 F. Supp. 911, 913 
(S.D.N.Y. 1963), aff’d, 329 F.2d 541 (2d Cir. 1964). The court determined that the defendant’s use 
was fair as a matter of law, apparently because it believed that no reasonable jury could find other-
wise. Id. (“It is obvious that defendants’ lyrics have little in common with plaintiffs’ but meter and a 
few words, except in two instances which will be discussed below. Defendants have created original, 
ingenious lyrics on subjects completely dissimilar from those of plaintiffs' songs.”). In Time Inc. v. 
Bernard Geis Assocs., the copyright holder argued infringement based on the defendant’s use of film 
frames portraying President Kennedy’s assassination. 293 F. Supp. 130, 144–46 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). 
The court determined that the defendant’s use was fair as a matter of law. Id. In that instance, how-
ever, the court treated the issue as a pure matter of law, uninfluenced by the fact reasonable minds 
might disagree. See id. 
 60. See MCA, Inc. v. Wilson, 677 F.2d 180, 183 (2d Cir. 1981) (“[W]e may now review the 
evidence to determine whether the district court’s rejection of the fair-use defense was clearly erro-
neous. Since the issue of fair use is one of fact, the clearly erroneous standard of review is appropri-
ate.” (citation omitted)); Eisenschiml v. Fawcett Publ’ns, Inc., 246 F.2d 598, 604 (7th Cir. 1957) 
(“[T]he issue of fair use is a question of fact. We cannot say that the Master’s finding in this respect 
is clearly erroneous.” (citation omitted)); see also Piper Aircraft Corp. v. Wag-Aero, Inc., 741 F.2d 
925, 936 (7th Cir. 1984) (Posner, J., concurring) (“[C]lear error has been held to be the proper stand-
ard for reviewing determinations of most mixed questions of law and fact in intellectual-property 
cases—such questions as similarity, copying, access, and fair use in copyright cases . . . .”(citations 
omitted)). In at least one situation, an appellate court characterized the weighing of inferences as 
raising a legal question, and so the court purported to apply a standard of review that was freer than 
clear error. See Triangle Publ’ns, Inc. v. Knight-Ridder Newspapers, Inc., 626 F.2d 1171, 1175 n.11 
(5th Cir. 1980). The language of that appellate court implies that clear error is the appropriate stand-
ard of review in fair use cases: 
We assume without deciding that a lower Court’s finding that there was or was not fair 
use is normally a finding of fact subject to the clearly erroneous rule of F.R.Civ.P. 52(a). 
However, this Circuit has repeatedly made clear that the clearly erroneous rule does not 
apply to findings made under an erroneous view of controlling legal principles. We be-
lieve that in viewing commercial motive as conclusive on the question of fair use, the 
District Court incorrectly applied s 107. Accordingly, its finding of no fair use defense is 
not subject to a clearly erroneous standard. Rather, we are more free to determine the 
question of fair use. . . . [And e]ven assuming the clearly erroneous standard is the appro-
priate one, we believe that the District Court’s conclusion on the fair use question is in-
deed clearly erroneous.  
Id. at 1175 & n.11 (citations omitted). 
 61. See, e.g., DC Comics, Inc. v. Reel Fantasy, Inc., 696 F.2d 24, 28 (2d Cir. 1982) (“The four 
factors listed in Section 107 raise essentially factual issues and . . . are normally questions for the 
jury.”); Meeropol v. Nizer, 560 F.2d 1061, 1071 (2d Cir. 1977) (reversing district court’s grant of 
summary judgment for defendants; stating that “whether or not there has been substantial use which 
would deprive appellees of the fair use defense is a decision which must be made by the trier of fact 
after all the evidence has been introduced”); Higgins v. Baker, 309 F. Supp. 635, 637 (S.D.N.Y. 
1969) (relying on Professor Melville Nimmer’s position that “the issue of ‘fair use’ presents ques-
tions of fact and thus should not be determined on a motion for summary judgment”). 
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where no reasonable juror could find otherwise.
62
 Notably, several of 
those courts admitted that summary judgment was usually inappropriate 
for deciding fair use.
63
 Still other courts treated fair use as a pure issue of 
law: in deciding fair use on summary judgment, some trial courts com-
pletely disregarded whether a reasonable jury could find otherwise;
64
 on 
appeal, some appellate courts applied a de novo standard.
65
 
By the 1990s, trial courts were routinely deciding fair use as a mat-
ter of law, and appellate courts were applying de novo review.
66
 No 
longer did courts heed Arnstein’s strong admonition that issues in copy-
right cases were particularly ill suited for judges to decide.
67
 And no 
longer did courts rule as a matter of law only where they believed that no 
reasonable jury could find otherwise.
68
 Fair use became a pure issue of 
law for judges.
69




 62. See, e.g., Amana Refrigeration, Inc. v. Consumers Union of U. S., Inc., 431 F. Supp. 324, 
326 (D. Iowa 1977) (finding on summary judgment that fair use could not apply, and noting that 
evidence of fair use could lead to only one reasonable interpretation). Some courts were not always 
clear on whether they were applying the no-reasonable-jury standard of summary judgment, or 
alternatively, are treating the issue as a pure matter of law. See, e.g., Gardner v. Nizer, 391 F. Supp. 
940, 944 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). 
 63. In Steinberg v. Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc., a district court granted a plaintiff’s 
motion for summary judgment where the defendant argued fair use. 663 F. Supp. 706, 709 (S.D.N.Y. 
1987). Recognizing the law’s preference for a jury to decide the issue, the Steinberg court explained 
that because both parties had expressly waived their right to a jury and because none of the evidence 
required assessing witness credibility, summary judgment was appropriate. Id. Under those circum-
stances, summary judgment would be indistinguishable from a bench trial. See also Quinto v. Legal 
Times of Wash., Inc., 506 F. Supp. 554, 563 (D.D.C. 1981) (granting summary judgment for plain-
tiff and in so doing, noting that “[a]lthough courts are highly reluctant to grant motions for summary 
judgment in copyright cases, this is an exceptional case in which summary judgment is appropriate” 
(citation omitted)). 
 64. See, e.g., Walt Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751, 753–54, 757–58 (9th Cir. 1978) 
(affirming summary judgment that denied fair use on grounds that substantiality of copying out-
weighed parodic nature of use, and reciting district court’s view that issues for consideration on 
summary judgment were “purely legal”); Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Moral Majority, Inc., 606 F. 
Supp. 1526, 1531–32 (C.D. Cal. 1985), aff’d, 796 F.2d 1148 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding that summary 
judgment of fair use is appropriate where parties do not dispute historical facts); Elsmere Music, Inc. 
v. NBC, 482 F. Supp. 741, 744 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (contemplating fair use on summary judgment; 
stating that“[a]s no dispute exists as to the facts giving rise to this action, but only as to the legal 
consequences, the Court believes this case to be appropriate for summary disposition”). 
 65. See, e.g., Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432, 436 (9th Cir. 1986) (“The parties dispute only the 
ultimate conclusions to be drawn from the admitted facts. Because these judgments are legal in 
nature, we can make them without usurping the function of the jury.” (citation omitted)). 
 66. See Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of U.S. Copyright Fair Use Opinions, 1978–2005, 
156 U. PA. L. REV. 549, 554 (2008) (noting empirical trend demonstrating a “remarkable increase in 
the prevalence of fair use summary judgment opinions that began in the mid-1990s and has contin-
ued to the present”); Snow, supra note 1, at 532–33. 
 67. See Snow, supra note 1, at 532–33. 
 68. See id. 
 69. See, e.g., Infinity Broad. Corp. v. Kirkwood, 150 F.3d 104, 111–12 (2d Cir. 1998) (ruling 
for plaintiff on summary judgment, thereby reversing district court’s grant of summary judgment for 
defendant, and commenting that one of the factors in the fair-use analysis—the weighty factor of 
market impact—posed “a very close question” but that “[o]n balance” that factor “tips” toward the 
plaintiff on grounds that defendant failed to demonstrate “an absence” of a “potential” for market 
harm); Television Digest, Inc. v. U.S. Tele. Ass’n, 841 F. Supp. 5, 9 (D.D.C. 1993) (expressly reject-
ing defendant’s argument that a fair-use decision is improper on a motion for summary judgment); 
see also Snow, supra note 1, at 531–33. 
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B. The Misinterpretation of Harper  
Instrumental in the change of judicial treatment toward fair use 
were two sentences in a 1985 Supreme Court decision, Harper & Row, 
Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises.
71
 There the defendant had pub-
lished the copyright holder’s memoirs of President Ford in a news maga-
zine.
72
 The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s bench trial judg-
ment that denied defendants’ argument of fair use.
73
  
Two sentences in the Harper Court’s opinion have been misinter-
preted by appellate courts as suggesting a de novo standard of review. 
The first sentence that led to confusion among courts was the following: 
“Fair use is a mixed question of law and fact.”
74
 On the one hand, it is 
understandable that the Harper Court labeled fair use as a mixed ques-
tion of law and fact: the inquiry necessitates applying legal principles to 
factual circumstances.
75
 On the other hand, courts had up to that point 
usually labeled fair use as a question of fact.
76
 By employing the label of 
“mixed question,” the Court had departed from the usual label that courts 
had employed to describe fair use. The Court had created an ambiguity. 
Unlike the prior label of “question of fact,”
77
 “mixed question” left open 
the issue of whether the inferences that arise in applying the legal princi-
ples of fair use to the factual circumstances of a case should be treated as 
  
 70. See Snow, supra note 1, at 531. At least one court, however, has retained the factual 
characteristic of fair use. In Harris v. San Jose Mercury News,  the trial court explained:  
Because the underlying facts are not in dispute, defendant contends that the Court should 
weigh the fair use factors and determine whether the defense applies as a matter of law. 
While the Court may analyze the factors and make a determination on this mixed ques-
tion of law and fact, the Court believes that inferences to be drawn from undisputed facts 
are questions more appropriately resolved by a jury than a judge. Moreover, the Ninth 
Circuit Model Jury Instructions includes an instruction for a fair use defense, which fur-
ther supports this conclusion. 
No. C 04–05262 CRB, 2006 WL 995151, at *2 (N.D. Cal. April 10, 2006). 
 71. See 471 U.S. 539, 561 (1985). 
 72. Id. at 541–42. 
 73. Id. at 543, 569.  
 74. Id. at 560. 
 75. See Meeropol v. Nizer, 560 F.2d 1061, 1068 (2d Cir. 1977). 
 76. Prior to Harper, few courts had characterized fair use as presenting a mixed question of 
fact and law. See Pac. & S. Co. v. Duncan, 744 F.2d 1490, 1495 n.8 (11th Cir. 1984)); Meeropol, 
417 F. Supp. at 1213, rev’d, 560 F.2d 1061 (2d Cir. 1977). Notably, in 1984 Judge Posner stated in 
dicta that fair use presents a mixed question of fact and law for which clear error is the proper stand-
ard of review. See Piper Aircraft Corp. v. Wag-Aero, Inc., 741 F.2d 925, 936 (7th Cir. 1984); see 
also William Patry, Comment to Who is the Proper Decisionmaker on Questions of Fair Use—The 
Judge or a Jury, EON (July 19, 2009, 9:41 PM), (“The characterization about fair use being a mixed 
question of law and fact . . . originated I believe with the 11th [C]ircuit in one of its early Pacific & 
Southern v. Duncan cases.”), http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/nesson/2009/07/20/summary-judgment-
morning-mail/. 
 77. See, e.g., Mathews Conveyor Co. v. PalmerBee Co., 135 F.2d 73, 85 (6th Cir. 1943) (“As 
fair use is to be determined by a consideration of all the evidence in the case, so, likewise, is the 
question of infringement one of fact to be solved by a study of the evidence.”). 
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In resolving this ambiguity, lower courts looked to the next sentence 
of Harper:
79
 “Where the district court has found facts sufficient to evalu-
ate each of the statutory factors, an appellate court need not remand for 
further factfinding . . . [but] may conclude as a matter of law that [the 




This sentence—which I refer to as the further-factfinding sen-
tence—became central in the judicial shift from classifying the infer-
ences in the fair-use analysis as raising questions of fact to questions of 
law. As I discuss in the subsections below, the further-factfinding sen-
tence led courts to mistakenly interpret Harper as declaring that fair use 
was a pure issue of law for judges to decide. 
1. The Ninth Circuit’s Mistaken Interpretation 
One year after Harper, the Ninth Circuit in Fisher v. Dees
81
 misin-
terpreted the further-factfinding sentence to mean that the only elements 
of the fair-use analysis that are treated as factual are the historical facts—
those which are evaluated under the legal principles of fair use.
82
 In 
Fisher, the trial court had granted summary judgment for the fair user, 
and on appeal, the copyright holder argued that the jury should have de-
cided the question of fair use, absent a finding that no reasonable jury 
could have found otherwise.
83
 The Ninth Circuit immediately rejected 
this argument.
84
 It interpreted the further-factfinding sentence in Harper 
  
 78. 9C CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 
§ 2589, (3d ed. 1998) (“There is no uniform standard for reviewing mixed questions of law and 
fact.”). Often courts examine whether the inquiry is primarily factual or legal. See id.; see also, e.g., 
Uzdavines v. Weeks Marine, Inc., 418 F.3d 138, 143 (2d Cir. 2005) ( “[M]ixed questions of law and 
fact [are reviewed] either de novo or under the clearly erroneous standard depending on whether the 
question is predominantly legal or factual.” (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)); 
Armstrong v. Comm’r, 15 F.3d 970, 973 (10th Cir. 1995) (“We review mixed questions under the 
clearly erroneous or de novo standard, depending on whether the mixed question involves primarily 
a factual inquiry or the consideration of legal principles.”); Woods v. Bourne Co., 60 F.3d 978, 991 
(2d Cir. 1995) (explaining that in reviewing the mixed question of substantial similarity in the copy-
right context, the court reviews for clear error). 
 79. E.g., Infinity Broad. Corp. v. Kirkwood, 150 F.3d 104, 107 (2d Cir. 1998) (interpreting 
the quoted two sentences of Harper as requiring de novo review); New Era Publ’ns Int’l., ApS v. 
Carol Publ’g Grp., 904 F.2d 152, 155 (2d Cir. 1990) (relying on the quoted two sentences of Harper 
to freely review issue of fair use). 
 80. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 560 (1985) (alteration in 
original) (internal quotation marks omitted). Although the internal quotations are omitted in the 
above text, the Court quoted a portion of this sentence from Pac. & S. Co. v. Duncan, 744 F.2d 
1490, 1495 (11th Cir. 1984). For a discussion of how that decision employed the relevant language, 
see infra note 99. 
 81. 794 F.2d 432 (9th Cir. 1986). 
 82. Id. at 436. 
 83. Id. The defendant had composed a song entitled, “When Sonny Sniffs Glue,” as a comedic 
version of the copyright holder’s song, “When Sunny Gets Blue.” Id. at 434. 
 84. Id. 
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to mean that the inferences in the analysis are legal in nature.
85
 Accord-
ing to the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation, trial courts determine those in-
ferences as a matter of law
86
 and appellate courts review them de novo.
87
 
That interpretation other courts soon adopted.
88
 
The flawed nature of the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation is evident 
from the fact that the sentence refers to the process of drawing fair-use 
inferences as a process of “further factfinding.”
89
 The instruction that 
courts “need not remand for further factfinding” means that appellate 
courts could remand for further factfinding, but that they are not required 
to do so.
90
 That is, the phrase “need not remand” implies that courts in 
fact could remand, but that it is not necessary, and the phrase “for further 
factfinding” demonstrates that if courts were to remand, the remand 
would be “for further factfinding.” That further factfinding on remand, 
then, could not represent a finding of historical facts, i.e., facts “suffi-
cient to evaluate each of the statutory factors,” for in the situation that the 
Court posed, the trial court had already found the historical facts neces-
  
 85. Id. at 436 (“The parties dispute only the ultimate conclusions to be drawn from the admit-
ted facts. Because, under Harper & Row, these judgments are legal in nature, we can make them 
without usurping the function of the jury.”). 
 86. Id. at 434; see also Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792, 800 (9th Cir. 
2003) (“We recently noted as fair use is a mixed question of fact and law, so long as the record is 
sufficient to evaluate each of the statutory factors, we may reweigh on appeal the inferences to be 
drawn from that record.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); L.A. News Serv. v. Reuters Television 
Int’l, Ltd., 149 F.3d 987, 993 (9th Cir. 1998) (interpreting caselaw as “rejecting [the] argument that 
fair use is appropriate for determination by summary judgment only when no reasonable jury could 
have decided the question differently”); Snow, supra note 1, at 531–33 (discussing cases where 
courts treat fair use as pure question of law for judge). But see Ty, Inc. v. Publ’ns Int’l. Ltd., 292 
F.3d 512, 516 (7th Cir. 2002) (Posner, J.) (“Fair use is a mixed question of law and fact, which 
means that it may be resolved on summary judgment if a reasonable trier of fact could reach only 
one conclusion—but not otherwise.” (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 87. See, e.g., Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley Ltd., 448 F.3d 605, 607 (2d Cir. 
2006) (reviewing de novo fair-use finding); Wall Data Inc. v. L.A. Cnty. Sheriff’s Dept., 447 F.3d 
769, 777 (9th Cir. 2006) (“We also review de novo the district court’s finding of fair use under the 
Copyright Act, a mixed question of law and fact.”); Mattel, 353 F.3d at 799 (“We also review the 
district court's finding of fair use under the Copyright Act, a mixed question of law and fact, by the 
same de novo standard.”); Castle Rock Entm’t v. Carol Pub. Grp, Inc., 150 F.3d 132, 137 (2d Cir. 
1998) (reviewing de novo the four-factor analysis); Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 60 F.3d 
913, 918 (2d Cir. 1994) (relying on Harper for de novo review of fair use).  
 88. See, e.g., Princeton Univ. Press v. Mich. Document Servs., Inc., 855 F. Supp. 905, 909 
(E.D. Mich. 1994) (relying on Harper, 471 U.S. at 560, to deny fair use as a matter of law at sum-
mary judgment), aff’d, 99 F.3d 1381 (6th Cir. 1996); Am. Geophysical Union, 60 F.3d 913, 918–32 
(2d Cir.1994) (relying on Harper, 471 U.S. at 560, to engage in de novo review of fair-use analysis, 
denying fair use); Fitzgerald v. CBS Broad., Inc., 491 F. Supp. 2d 177, 181, 183–84 (D. Mass. 2007) 
(deciding issue of fair use on summary judgment for copyright holder on grounds that, according to 
Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432, 436 (9th Cir. 1986), court may perform the fair-use analysis); see also 
sources cited supra notes 86–87. 
 89. Despite the faulty reasoning of the Ninth Circuit in Fisher, its holding is consistent with 
the proposal of this Article. The Article proposes that trial courts should decide summary judgment 
in favor of fair users, which the trial court did in Fisher, 794 F.2d at 434. See discussion infra Part 
IV.A. The Article further proposes that an appellate court may affirm such a grant of summary 
judgment under a clear error standard, yet in doing so, the appellate court may, if it so chooses, 
articulate legal principles that guide the fair-use analysis as a matter of law. See discussion infra Part 
III.C.2.b(1). The Ninth Circuit’s ruling as a matter of law in Fisher, therefore, is consistent with the 
proposal herein. Its reasoning for doing so, on the other hand, is not. 
 90. See Harper, 471 U.S. at 560. 
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sary to perform the analysis.
91
 Further factfinding must correspond to 
something other than the historical facts. And other than the historical 
facts, the only determinations to be made in the analysis are the infer-
ences, so the further factfinding must correspond to the drawing of infer-
ences. Implicit in the further-factfinding sentence of Harper, then, is the 
conclusion that the inferences in the analysis constitute a process of 
factfinding. 
In addition to the further-factfinding sentence of Harper, the con-
text of Harper also indicates that the Court did not intend for this sen-
tence to mean that fair-use inferences are legal in nature. Two centuries 
of common law precedent had treated these inferences as questions of 
fact for the jury.
92
 Just two years before Harper, the Second Circuit had 
reversed a summary judgment decision on the grounds that fair use 
“raise[s] essentially factual issues . . . [that] are normally questions for 
the jury.”
93
 Given the entrenched and active history of courts treating fair 
use as a question of fact, it is unlikely that the Harper Court intended 
through one sentence to affect the monumental change of treating fair 
use as a question of law. The point was not even directly before the 
Court. And the author of Harper, Justice O’Connor, is well known for 
her adherence to common law precedent absent a showing of necessity.
94
 
Hence, to interpret the further-factfinding sentence in Harper as suggest-
ing that the fair-use inferences should become legal in nature would be to 
impute to the Court an intent to re-draw the line between fact and law, 
which was patently absent. 
Thus, the Ninth Circuit was simply wrong to interpret Harper as 
holding that the inferences in the fair-use analysis represented pure issues 
of law. Doing so affected an unintentional and historical change.  
2. Possible Meanings of the Ambiguous Further-Factfinding Sen-
tence 
The further-factfinding sentence in Harper, which the Ninth Circuit 
erroneously interpreted, may connote one of two meanings. The first 
meaning is that appellate courts may affirm a trial court’s denial of fair 
use without knowing the factual findings that the trial court relied on to 
reach its judgment.
95
 According to usual appellate procedure, appellate 
  
 91. See id. 
 92. See, e.g., Sayre v. Moore, (1785) 1 East 361, 362 (K.B.) (Lord Mansfield, C.J.) (“In all 
these cases the question of fact to come before a jury is, whether the alteration be colourable or not? 
. . . [T]he jury will decide whether it be servile imitation or not.”); Emerson v. Davies, 8 F. Cas. 615, 
623–24 (D. Mass. 1845) (No. 4,436) (Story, J.); see also Snow, supra note 1, at 518–28 (outlining 
two-hundred year history of courts treating fair use as factual issue for the jury). 
 93. DC Comics Inc. v. Reel Fantasy, Inc., 696 F.2d 24, 28 (2d Cir. 1982). 
 94. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854 (1992) (“[T]he very con-
cept of the rule of law underlying our own Constitution requires such continuity over time that a 
respect for precedent is, by definition, indispensable.” (citation omitted)). 
 95. See Snow, supra note 1, at 538–39. 
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courts must vacate a trial judgment that fails to specify the factual find-
ings that support the trial court’s judgment, remanding the case for the 
trial court to articulate those findings.
96
 In Harper, the trial court had 
failed to specify relevant factual findings in the fair-use analysis, so un-
der usual appellate procedure, it is arguable that the appellate court 
should have remanded the case for the trial court to specify those find-
ings.
97
 It is possible, then, that through the further-factfinding sentence, 
the Harper Court was instructing appellate courts merely not to apply the 
usual procedure.
98
 The Court could have been instructing appellate courts 
to affirm the trial judgment as a matter of law if the appellate court is 
able to draw factual inferences supporting the judgment, despite the fact 
that the trial court failed to specify those inferences as findings.
99
 Stated 
another way, if inferences exist that reasonably support the trial judg-
ment, an appellate court should affirm the judgment as a matter of law. 
Under this interpretation, the Court’s “as a matter of law” phrase would 
apply only to the trial court’s ultimate judgment. This interpretation fur-
ther suggests that appellate courts are to defer to the trial court’s possible 
findings of fact—a clear error standard of review. 
The second possible meaning of the further-factfinding sentence is 
that although the inferences in the fair-use analysis constitute findings of 
fact, appellate courts may review those inferences de novo. As I explain 
above, the Court’s language implies that it was treating those inferences 
as factual in nature when it referred to the process of drawing those in-
  
 96. See Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 292 n.22 (1982) (“Where the trial court 
fails to make findings, or to find on a material issue, and an appeal is taken, the appellate court will 
normally vacate the judgment and remand the action for appropriate findings to be made.” (citation 
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 97. See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 557 F. Supp. 1067, 1072 (S.D.N.Y. 
1983). The extent of the trial court’s fair-use analysis consisted of the following three sentences: 
Assessing the “fair use” factors, I conclude here, too, that none of them provide The Na-
tion with the absolution it seeks. First, the article was published for profit. Second, the in-
fringed work was soon-to-be published. Third, The Nation took what was essentially the 
heart of the book, and fourth, the effect of The Nation’s extensive use of the Nixon par-
don material caused the Time agreement to be aborted and thus diminished the value of 
the copyright. 
Id. (footnotes omitted). These statements may or may not be an adequate analysis of the four factors 
to support its ultimate judgment. This is a borderline case. By contrast, in Pacific & Southern Co. v. 
Duncan—the case from which the Harper Court quoted the further fact-finding sentence—the trial 
court had failed to engage in any analysis of the facts under the four factors. 744 F.2d 1490, 1495 
(11th Cir. 1984). 
 98. See Snow, supra note 1, at 537–39. 
 99. This interpretation is consistent with the appellate decision from which the Harper Court 
quoted the further fact-finding sentence. Pacific, 744 F.2d at 1495 (“Despite the district court’s 
erroneous interpretation of the law, we need not remand this case for further fact-finding. The dis-
trict court resolved all the issues of fact necessary for us to conclude as a matter of law that TV 
News Clips’ activities do not qualify as a fair use of the copyrighted work.”). In Pacific, the district 
court had failed to analyze any of the historical facts under the statutory factors. Id. The district court 
had erroneously interpreted the Copyright Act as not requiring it to analyze the factual circumstances 
under these factors. Id. In light of that erroneous interpretation, the district court failed to perform 
“further fact-finding” that was necessary to support its judgment. See id. Nevertheless, the appellate 
court appeared to believe that if it could draw inferences that supported the judgment, it could go 
ahead and affirm as a matter of law. See id. 
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ferences as a process of “further factfinding.”
100
 At the same time, the 
Court’s language could further mean that appellate courts need not re-
mand for the trial court to perform that factfinding because the appellate 
court may draw those inferences itself as a matter of law.
101
 In other 
words, the trial court judgment and its factual findings are to be reviewed 
as a matter of law. Under this interpretation, the Court’s “as a matter of 
law” phrase would apply to the trial court’s process of drawing the factu-
al inferences. This suggests a de novo standard of review. 
At first glance, this second interpretation seems incorrect because it 
suggests that courts may review factual findings de novo. Under Rule 52, 
factual findings are to be reviewed for clear error.
102
 Even on mixed 
questions, the factual portion of the mixed question is reviewed for clear 
error,
103
 and the inferences in the fair-use analysis are factual in nature 
for jury consideration.
104
 There is, however, an exception to the mandate 
of Rule 52: independent review of a constitutional fact.
105
 Where a factu-
al finding determines the constitutional rights of a litigant, appellate 
courts refer to that finding as a constitutional fact.
106
 Constitutional facts 
raise factual questions that are subject to de novo review to ensure pro-
tection of the litigant’s constitutional right.
107
 I discuss this doctrine as 
applied to fair use more fully below in Part III. For now, it suffices to 
note that this second interpretation of the further-factfinding sentence is 
consistent with the doctrine of independent review.  
  
 100. See Harper, 471 U.S. at 560. 
 101. See id. 
 102. See FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a)(6) (“Findings of fact, whether based on oral or other evidence, 
must not be set aside unless clearly erroneous . . . .”). 
 103. See United States v. Wright, 582 F.3d 199, 205 (1st Cir. 2009) (“[T]he factual component 
of this ‘mixed question of law and fact’ remains subject to clear error review.” (citation omitted)); 
Anglo-Iberia Underwriting Mgmt. Co. v. Lodderhose, 235 Fed. Appx. 776, 780 n.5 (2d Cir. 2007) 
(“Of course, even if apparent authority were a mixed question of law and fact, we would still review 
factual components for clear error.”); see also cases cited supra note 8. 
 104. See Snow, supra note 1, at 556. 
 105. The Supreme Court articulated this doctrine of independent review as follows in Bose 
Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc.: 
The requirement of independent appellate review reiterated in New York Times Co. v. 
Sullivan is a rule of federal constitutional law. It emerged from the exigency of deciding 
concrete cases; it is law in its purest form under our common-law heritage. It reflects a 
deeply held conviction that judges—and particularly Members of this Court—must exer-
cise such review in order to preserve the precious liberties established and ordained by 
the Constitution. The question whether the evidence in the record in a defamation case is 
of the convincing clarity required to strip the utterance of First Amendment protection is 
not merely a question for the trier of fact. Judges, as expositors of the Constitution, must 
independently decide whether the evidence in the record is sufficient to cross the consti-
tutional threshold that bars the entry of any judgment that is not supported by clear and 
convincing proof of “actual malice.” 
466 U.S. 485, 510–11 (1984). 
 106. See, e.g., id. at 508 n.27. 
 107. See id. at 499 (“[I]n cases raising First Amendment issues we have repeatedly held that an 
appellate court has an obligation to make an independent examination of the whole record in order to 
make sure that the judgment does not constitute a forbidden intrusion on the field of free expres-
sion.” (internal quotations omitted)). 
File: SNOW_FINAL_To_Darby-4.doc Created on: 5/2/2012 6:00:00 PM Last Printed: 5/23/2012 7:23:00 PM 
16 DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 89:1  
As between the two possible meanings of the further-factfinding 
sentence, the Harper Court did not provide any clue as to which one is 
correct. On the one hand, the Court’s fair-use analysis in Harper appears 
entirely unfettered, without any regard or deference to the trial court 
opinion.
108
 This is consistent with the interpretation that appellate courts 
should apply de novo review to the process of finding facts that support 
an ultimate judgment. On the other hand, the trial court in Harper had 
failed to make relevant findings in the fair-use analysis, such that the 
Court had scant, if any, findings to defer to.
109
 This is consistent with the 
interpretation that appellate courts should apply de novo review only to 
the ultimate judgment, deferring to any factual findings that support that 
judgment. 
Thus, the meaning of the further-factfinding sentence is unclear. 
What is clear, though, is that the sentence does not mean that the infer-
ences in the fair-use analysis should be construed as pure issues of law 
for a trial judge to adjudicate. Under either of the two possible interpreta-
tions of the further-factfinding sentence, fair use would still be a question 
of fact. Specifically, as a sentence suggesting that it is unnecessary to 
remand for factual findings that go further than mere historical facts, the 
sentence would imply that fair use raises inferences of fact. Alternative-
ly, as a sentence suggesting that de novo review is appropriate under the 
doctrine of independent review, the sentence would imply that fair use 
raises inferences of constitutional fact. Under either interpretation, it 
would be incorrect to construe the sentence as meaning that the infer-
ences in the fair-use analysis must be legal. But as I discuss in Part I.A 
above, courts did just that.  
Hence, the present state of the law is that courts have adopted a mis-
taken meaning of the further-factfinding sentence, construing it to mean 
that fair use constitutes an issue of law, contrary to the well established 
history of courts treating it as an issue of fact. This historical departure 
from precedent occurred without reasoned deliberation. It simply oc-
curred, seemingly unintentionally.  
In another article, I argue for a return to fair use’s original construc-
tion as a question of fact.
110
 In short, I argue that the Seventh Amend-
ment mandates that fair use be construed as a fact issue for jury consid-
eration.
111
 Yet even assuming that courts return to the original construc-
tion of fair use as a factual matter, the question remains as to whether 
courts may ever decide fair use as a matter of law—without running 
afoul of the Seventh Amendment. That question I address in the two 
parts below.  
  
 108. See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 549-69 (1985). 
 109. See id. 
 110. See Snow, supra note 1, at 486. 
 111. See id. at 544–54. 
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III. APPELLATE COURT REVIEW 
My proposal in another article that fair use be treated as a fact issue 
for the jury leaves open the question of appellate review.
112
 I now ad-
dress that question. I ultimately propose a double standard of review for 
fair use questions. Specifically, for jury verdicts that favor a fair user, the 
clear error standard should govern appellate review. For everything else, 
de novo should govern. My reason for proposing this double standard 
stems from the judicial obligation to protect speech interests that underlie 
fair use. Supreme Court precedent dictates an independent review—or in 
other words, de novo review—of facts that determine constitutional 
rights.
113
 And as I explain below, fair use represents such a right. 
A. Fair Use Under Bose  
The proposal that a de novo standard, rather than a clear error 
standard, should govern review of fair use cases turns on the constitu-
tional doctrine of independent review.
114
 Most instructive on this doctrine 
is the case of Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States.
115
 There, 
a manufacturer of loud speakers, Bose, sued the defendant for libel when 
the defendant published a critical review of the Bose speakers in its mag-
azine, Consumer Reports.
116
 After a bench trial, the district court made 
factual findings that the defendants had made a disparaging, false state-
ment of fact and that the defendant made it without regard for its truth or 
falsity.
117
 The Supreme Court ultimately held that as a matter of law 
Bose had failed to prove that the defendant had made the defamatory 
statement without regard for its truth or falsity.
118
 In reaching this hold-
ing, the Court conducted an independent review of the record, applying a 
de novo standard rather than clear error. The doctrine of independent 
review, the Court explained, imposes a constitutional obligation on ap-
pellate courts to review allegations of constitutional fact independent of 
the trial court finding.
119
 The Court defined constitutional facts to mean 
“special facts that have been deemed to have constitutional signifi-
  
 112. Snow, supra note 1, at 510 n.150 (“This [a]rticle . . . addresses only the general question 
of whether fair use represents a question of fact or law for the jury or judge, absent extraordinary 
circumstances. In a forthcoming article, the Author will explore such circumstances where judges 
may decide fair use as a matter of law.”). 
 113. See Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 510–11 (1984). 
 114. See Eugene Volokh & Brett McDonnell, Freedom of Speech and Independent Judgment 
Review in Copyright Cases, 107 YALE L.J. 2431, 2433–35, 2468 (1998) (arguing for speech proce-
dural protection of proof burden to apply in fair-use context based on speech nature of copied ex-
pression); see also Ned Snow, Proving Fair Use: Burden of Proof as Burden of Speech, 31 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1781, 1795–804, 1807–10 (2010) (same); cf. Mark A. Lemley & Eugene Volokh, 
Freedom of Speech and Injunctions in Intellectual Property Cases, 48 DUKE L.J. 147, 209–10 
(1998) (advocating ban on preliminary injunctions in copyright context). 
 115. 466 U.S. 485, 510–11 (1984). 
 116. Id. at 487–88. 
 117. Id. at 490–91. 
 118. Id. at 511. 
 119. Id. at 505, 510–11. See supra note 105. 
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cance.”
120
 Hence, a judge’s obligation to uphold constitutional rights 
demands that she perform an independent review of alleged facts to de-
termine whether a claimed constitutional right is upheld.
121
 








 and campaign finance to name a few.
125
 Fair use 
should be no different. This conclusion presumes, of course, that fair use 
merits protection under the Free Speech Clause. This premise raises its 
own discussion outside the scope of this Article. I will not argue this 
premise here, except to note that a few courts—including the Supreme 
Court in dicta—and several scholars have recognized fair use as a consti-
tutional requirement in copyright.
126
 Yet the premise is by no means well 
established. I therefore only briefly explain the argument for constitu-
tional speech protection and direct readers to other more extensive au-
thorities that argue for this premise.
127
 In short, fair use eases the harsh 
speech-suppressive nature of copyright; it communicates thought distinct 
from the underlying work.
128
 The critical review of another’s work, the 
reporting of news, the scholarly demonstration of truth—each of these 
activities may require copying expression and each may merit protection 
from copyright as independent speech.
129
 Inferences in the fair-use analy-
sis ultimately determine the scope of a fair user’s First Amendment right 
of speech. On the premise that fair use constitutes a speech-protective 
  
 120. Bose, 466 U.S. at 505.  
 121. Id. at 510–11 (“The requirement of independent appellate review . . . is a rule of federal 
constitutional law. . . . It reflects a deeply held conviction that judges—and particularly Members of 
this Court—must exercise such review in order to preserve the precious liberties established and 
ordained by the Constitution.”). 
 122. See id. at 506–08. (citing precedent to establish established practice of applying independ-
ent review in various speech contexts).  
 123. See id. at 505–06. 
 124. See, e.g., Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 384–86, 386 n.9 (1987). 
 125. See, e.g., Homans v. City of Albuquerque, 366 F.3d 900, 904 (10th Cir. 2004) (campaign 
finance reform); see also Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., 515 U.S. 557, 
567–68 (1995) (expressive association). 
 126. The tension between the First Amendment and copyright has been well recognized in 
judicial opinion and scholarship alike. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219, 221 (2003) (de-
scribing fair use as a “free speech safeguard[]” and a “First Amendment accommodation[]”); Harper 
& Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 559–60 (1985); Chi. Bd. of Educ. v. Sub-
stance, Inc., 354 F.3d 624, 631 (7th Cir. 2003) (Posner, J.) (“The First Amendment adds nothing to 
the fair use defense.”); NEIL WEINSTOCK NETANEL, COPYRIGHT’S PARADOX 3–12 (2008); see 
generally Paul Goldstein, Copyright and the First Amendment, 70 COLUM. L. REV. 983 (1970); 
Lemley & Volokh, supra note 114; Lawrence Lessig, Copyright’s First Amendment, 48 UCLA L. 
REV. 1057 (2001); Melville B. Nimmer, Does Copyright Abridge the First Amendment Guarantees 
of Free Speech and Press?, 17 UCLA L. REV. 1180, 1181 (1970); Jed Rubenfeld, The Freedom of 
Imagination: Copyright’s Constitutionality, 112 YALE L.J. 1, 5–7 (2002); Eugene Volokh, Freedom 
of Speech and Intellectual Property: Some Thoughts After Eldred, 44 Liquormart, and Bartnicki, 40 
HOUS. L. REV. 697 (2003). 
 127. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 126. 
 128. See Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1111–12 
(1990) (opining that the fair-use inquiry turns primarily on whether use transforms original expres-
sion). 
 129. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006); see also Eldred, 537 U.S. at 219–21. 
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Because the factual inferences in the fair-use analysis determine 
whether the First Amendment protects a fair user’s expression, those 
inferences fit the definition of constitutional facts.
131
 Independent review 
should therefore apply in the fair-use context. Indeed, in their article, 
Freedom of Speech and Independent Judgment Review in Copyright 
Cases, Professors Eugene Volokh and Brett McDonnell have argued that 
the doctrine of independent review should be just as applicable in the 
copyright context as it is in the libel context contemplated by Bose.
132
 As 
they point out, copyright is much like libel law in that both define unpro-
tected speech; and like the factfinding process in libel, the factfinding 
process in copyright “may misclassify . . . speech as unprotected.”
133
 
Because Bose makes clear that its holding applies wherever judgments 
might classify speech as unprotected,
134
 a fair-use decision must be sub-
ject to independent review.
135
 
B. Decisions Favoring Copyright Holders: De Novo Review 
The conclusion that independent review should apply in the fair-use 
context does not speak to whether all fair-use decisions should be subject 
to such review. Despite Bose’s clarity on explaining the necessity for 
independent review, Bose leaves unanswered whether independent re-
view should occur even where the speaker prevails at trial.
136
 When the 
speaker prevails, de novo review would not benefit the speaker’s inter-
ests, so arguably it should not apply.
137
 On the other hand, de novo re-
view in that situation would allow appellate courts to better refine and 
clarify the law, so arguably it should apply.
138
  
These arguments are considered in the section below.
139
 At a mini-
mum, though, it can be said that Bose mandates de novo review where a 
trial outcome favors the litigant seeking to suppress speech—i.e., the 
  
 130. I address the argument that First Amendment interests serve not only fair users, but also 
copyright holders. See discussion infra Part III.C.2.a.ii. 
 131. See Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 510–11 (1984). 
 132. See Volokh & McDonnell, supra note 114, at 2437–39. 
 133. See id. at 2437. 
 134. Bose, 466 U.S. at 505–09 (outlining various speech contexts where independent review 
has been applied). 
 135. See Volokh & McDonnell, supra note 114, at 2437 (arguing that Bose should apply to 
copyright cases). 
 136. See United States v. Friday, 525 F.3d 938, 950 (10th Cir. 2008) (“[T]he Bose opinion does 
not make clear whether its more searching review—whose purpose was to avoid ‘a forbidden intru-
sion’ on First Amendment rights—applies symmetrically to district court findings that favor as well 
as disfavor the First Amendment claimant.” (citation omitted)). 
 137. See Multimedia Publ’g Co. of S.C. v. Greenville-Spartanburg Airport Dist., 991 F.2d 154, 
160 (4th Cir. 1993) (explaining rationale for refraining from independently reviewing constitutional 
facts where speaker prevails at trial level). 
 138. See Volokh & McDonnell, supra note 114, at 2442. 
 139. See discussion infra Part III.C.  
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copyright holder.
140
 This would be consistent with the Court’s treatment 
of fair use in Harper.
141
 Recall that the copyright holder in Harper pre-
vailed at a bench trial.
142
 On appeal, the Supreme Court performed its 
own analysis of whether the use was fair, ultimately affirming the trial 
court’s verdict.
143
 The Court did not employ any language in deference to 




Although courts have not yet expressly recognized that fair use de-
mands independent review, for many courts this proposal would not 
change present practices.
145
 Under the proposal, courts would continue to 
apply de novo review, but they would do so because of a constitutional 
obligation rather than because of the Ninth Circuit’s erroneous construc-
tion of fair-use inferences as being purely legal in nature. Consider the 
Eleventh Circuit’s treatment of fair use in SunTrust Bank v. Houghton 
Mifflin Co.
146
 The trial court had granted a preliminary injunction in fa-
vor of the copyright holder where the fair user had created a story, The 
Wind Done Gone, that appropriated characters, plot, and scenes, from the 
copyright holder’s story, Gone with the Wind.
147
 In reviewing the trial 
court decision, the appellate court’s analysis of whether the use was fair 
was anything but a review for clear error.
148
 The appellate court’s lan-
guage suggested it was not deferring to any inferences of the trial court 
in the least.
149
 And rather tellingly, the appellate court relied heavily on 
the First Amendment as a basis for applying fair use.
150
 SunTrust, then, 
serves as a model for constitutional independent review of fair use. Thus, 
where the copyright holder prevails at the trial level, courts should con-
tinue their present practice of applying de novo review, but they should 
do so out of their constitutional obligation to ensure speech protection 
rather than a mistaken belief that fair-use inferences are purely legal in 
nature. 
  
 140. See Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 491–92 (1984) (institut-
ing independent review where defendant-speaker had lost at trial). 
 141. See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 560–61 (1985).  
 142. See id. at 543. 
 143. See id. at 561–69. 
 144. See id. 
 145. Professor Volokh points out that all circuits practice independent review of fair use, and to 
the extent that this means a simple application of de novo review, that is correct. See Volokh & 
McDonnell, supra note 114, at 2461; see also discussion supra Part III.B (observing that for many 
courts the proposal to apply de novo review will not change their present practice). That said, no 
appellate court has purported to conduct independent review of fair use decisions based on the con-
stitutional duty as outlined in Bose.  
 146. 268 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 2001). 
 147. Id. at 1259. 
 148. See id. at 1269–76.  
 149. See id. (analyzing fair use with minimal reference to district court analysis). 
 150. See id. at 1264 (“First Amendment privileges are also preserved through the doctrine of 
fair use. Until codification of the fair-use doctrine in the 1976 Act, fair use was a judge-made right 
developed to preserve the constitutionality of copyright legislation by protecting First Amendment 
values.” (footnotes omitted)). 
File: SNOW_FINAL_To_Darby-4.doc Created on: 5/2/2012 6:00:00 PM Last Printed: 5/23/2012 7:23:00 PM 
2011] FAIR USE AS A MATTER OF LAW 21 
 
Some appellate courts, on the other hand, have employed clear error 
review on the issue of fair use.
151
 Such instances usually arise while re-
viewing a jury verdict. And this is incorrect. These appellate courts must 
instead adopt the de novo standard to review decisions where the copy-
right holder has prevailed at trial: even though a jury has made findings, 
the appellate court must independently review whether a fair user’s con-
stitutional right of speech demands a finding of fairness. Consider the 
case of Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. UMG Recordings, Inc.,
152
 where the 
putative fair user had created a song that employed elements of the copy-
right holder’s rap song.
153
 The Sixth Circuit deferred to jury findings in 
favor of the copyright holder despite the court’s recognition of compet-
ing inferences of fairness that cast significant doubt on those findings.
154
 
It is plausible to conclude that had the court applied de novo review, it 
would have reached a different outcome, especially in view of the fact 
that the court recognized that the use was “certainly transformative”—a 
characteristic that the Supreme Court had suggested could be dispositive 
under similar facts in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.
155
  
Hence, where the trial outcome favors the copyright holder, even on 
a jury verdict, de novo should govern the review. The independent re-
view would serve to protect the speech nature of fair use. 
  
 151. See, e.g., Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. UMG Recordings, Inc., 585 F.3d 267, 278 (6th Cir. 
2009). 
 152. 585 F.3d 267 (6th Cir. 2009). 
 153. See id. at 272–74. 
 154. Id. In Bridgeport, the defendant had created a song that employed three elements of the 
plaintiff’s song: (1) the phrase, “Bow wow wow, yippie yo, yippie yea”; (2) a repetition of the word, 
“dog” using a low tone; and (3) rhythmic panting. Id. at 272. The jury found that this use was not 
fair. Id. at 277–78. On appeal, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the verdict, deferring to the jury’s finding. 
Id. Significantly, the Sixth Circuit acknowledged that the defendant's use was “certainly transforma-
tive (first factor), having a different theme, mood, and tone from [the plaintiff’s song].” Id. This 
admission is significant, for it is well established that the transformation factor should weigh heavily 
in the fair-use analysis. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994); Leval, 
supra note 128, at 1111–12. The Sixth Circuit further recognized that the amount used constituted a 
“relatively small” portion of the plaintiff’s song. Bridgeport, 585 F.3d at 278. And it acknowledged 
the argument that the two songs targeted different markets. Id. Yet, despite these inferences that 
suggest fairness, the Sixth Circuit upheld the jury verdict: it cited competing inferences suggesting 
infringement and then concluded that the verdict reached by the jury “was not unreasonable.” Id.  
 155. 510 U.S. 569, 574–94 (1994). Had the Bridgeport court fulfilled its constitutional obliga-
tion to perform an independent review, the court likely would have reached a different outcome 
based on the similarity of its facts to those of Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., where the Su-
preme Court recognized that a defendant’s use of lyrics and rhythm from another song in the defend-
ant’s rap song likely constituted a fair use. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 574–94 (recognizing likely 
fairness of defendant’s use of identifiable phrases from plaintiff’s popular song in defendant’s rap 
song). This conclusion is supported by the fact that the Bridgeport court recognized the transforma-
tive nature of the use, which was an influential factor in Campbell. Compare Bridgeport, 585 F.3d at 
277–78, with Campbell, 510 U.S. at 574–94. 
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C. Decisions Favoring Fair Users: Mixed Review 
1. Bench Trials: De Novo Review 
No court has addressed whether independent review should apply 
where a fair user has prevailed at trial for the simple reason that courts do 
not rely on Bose in reviewing fair-use decisions. Bose itself is silent on 
whether independent review applies where the speaker prevails at trial.
156
 
In the wake of Bose’s silence, courts have considered the issue in con-
texts other than copyright.
157
 They are split on the issue. Some courts 
have read Bose to apply symmetrically, meaning that independent review 
applies wherever constitutional facts are disputed, regardless of which 
litigant has prevailed at trial.
158
 Their argument is that de novo review 
better enables appellate courts to clarify the boundaries of the constitu-
tional right.
159
 By contrast, other courts have read Bose to apply asym-
metrically, meaning that independent review should apply only where the 
speaker loses at trial.
160
 Their argument is that the authority for Bose to 
disregard Rule 52(a)’s mandate for clear error review comes from the 
judicial obligation to protect a constitutional right; and where the speaker 
prevails at trial, a review that defers to the trial court’s finding offers 
more protection to the right than does a de novo review.
161
  
Independent review where the fair user has prevailed at the trial lev-
el makes sense if the trial occurred before a judge. The decision of fair 
use rarely turns on witness credibility; rather, it turns on discretionary 
judgment and opinion regarding whether an admitted use is fair.
162
 Fair-
ness is determined by the subjective views of the factfinder.
163
 This in-
sight suggests that the process of determining fairness on appellate re-
view would closely imitate that process at a bench trial: on appeal, judg-
es exercise discretionary judgment and opinion in the same way that the 
judge did at trial. It would seem that the discretionary judgment and 
opinion of three appellate judges would likely be more reliable and accu-
rate than that of a single trial judge. Three heads are better than one. 
  
 156. See Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 490–91 (1984); United 
States v. Friday, 525 F.3d 938, 950 (10th Cir. 2008) (recognizing silence of Bose on this issue). 
 157. See, e.g., Don’s Porta Signs, Inc. v. City of Clearwater, 485 U.S. 981, 981–82 (1988) 
(White, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (noting split among circuits on Bose-application issue 
and desire to resolve issue). 
 158. See Friday, 525 F.3d at 950; Lindsay v. City of San Antonio, 821 F.2d 1103, 1107 (5th 
Cir. 1987). 
 159. See Volokh & McDonnell, supra note 114, at 2441–43 (explaining reasons for their en-
dorsement of symmetric approach). 
 160. See Multimedia Publ’g Co. of S.C., Inc. v. Greenville-Spartanburg Airport Dist., 991 F.2d 
154, 160 (4th Cir. 1993); Daily Herald Co. v. Munro, 838 F.2d 380, 383 (9th Cir. 1988); Planned 
Parenthood Ass’n/Chi. Area v. Chi. Transit Auth., 767 F.2d 1225, 1228–29 (7th Cir. 1985). 
 161. See Multimedia, 991 F.2d at 160. 
 162. See Snow, supra note 1, at 497–500; cf. United States v. Quaintance, 608 F.3d 717, 721 
n.3 (10th Cir. 2010) (“Even when the constitutional fact doctrine [of Bose] applies, credibility de-
terminations remain subject to clear error review.”). 
 163. See Snow, supra note 1, at 497–501. 
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This position is supported by Professor Volokh, who has argued that 
courts should apply Bose symmetrically in the copyright context of de-
ciding the issue of substantial similarity.
165
 Presumably, Professor 
Volokh holds this same belief in the context of fair use.
166
 And this posi-
tion is consistent with the present practice of courts.
167
 Indeed, the Su-
preme Court seems to have implicitly endorsed de novo review even 
where a fair user has prevailed at trial, insofar as the trial was before a 
judge. In Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc.,
168
 the 
district court conducted a lengthy trial over whether defendants were 
contributorily liable for producing video tape recorders, and the district 
court ruled for the defendants on the grounds that the VCR users were 
making a fair use of the copyrighted television broadcasts.
169
 On appeal, 
the Supreme Court engaged in its own fair-use analysis, which suggests 
that the Court was performing an independent review.
170
 Although the 
Court deferred to the district court’s findings of historical fact, the Court 
appeared to draw the inferences in the fair-use analysis independent of 
the district court’s analysis, even though the defendant had prevailed at 
trial.
171
 The analysis of the district court—i.e., the process of drawing 
inferences by applying the legal principles of fair use—seems to have 
  
 164. In addition to bench trials, preliminary injunctions and summary judgments would be 
subject to an independent review under this proposal for the same reason that the decision maker in 
those proceedings is a single judge. See discussion infra Part III.D (discussing scope of review in 
summary judgment proceeding). 
 165. See Volokh & McDonnell, supra note 114, at 2442. 
 166. See id. at 2461–62 (citing fact that appellate courts examine fair use under independent 
appellate review to support argument that independent appellate review should apply in substantial 
similarity context, and relying on Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. v. Campbell, 972 F.2d 1429, 1434 (6th Cir. 
1992), rev’d on other grounds, 510 U.S. 569 (1994), for this position, wherein the Sixth Circuit 
reviewed de novo the district court’s finding of fairness for the defendant); e-mail from Eugene 
Volokh, Gary T. Schwartz Professor of Law, UCLA Sch. of Law, to Ned Snow, Assoc. Professor of 
Law, Univ. of Arkansas Sch. of Law (Apr. 16, 2010, 18:39 CST) (on file with author) (advocating 
independent review in context of fair use). 
 167. See, e.g., Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 487 F.3d 701, 719–25 (9th Cir. 2007), 
amended by 504 F.3d 1146 (reviewing de novo district court’s grant of preliminary injunction for 
copyright holder); Nihon Keizai Shimbun, Inc. v. Comline Business Data, Inc., 166 F.3d 65, 72–74 
(2d Cir. 1999) (applying de novo review of four-factor analysis where defendant had lost at bench 
trial). 
 168. 464 U.S. 417 (1984) , superseded by statute, Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998, 
Pub. L. 105–304, 115 Stat. 2860, as recognized in Realnetworks, Inc. v. DVD Copy Control Ass’n, 
Inc., 641 F. Supp. 2d 913 (N.D. Cal. 2009). 
 169. Id. at 420–21. 
 170. See id. at 448–55.  
 171. See id. at 449 (“[T]he District Court’s findings plainly establish that time-shifting for 
private home use must be characterized as a noncommercial, nonprofit activity.”); id. at 450 (relying 
on district court’s finding of historical fact that market harm was speculative, and at best, minimal); 
id. at 456 (relying on the “findings of the District Court” to arrive at conclusion that use was fair). 
The Court did, however, employ other language suggesting that it deferred to the district court’s 
finding of fairness. See id. at 454–55 (“[W]e must conclude that this record amply supports the 
District Court’s conclusion that home time-shifting is fair use.”). 
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been subject to independent review. De novo review of bench trials 
would thus be consistent with precedent. 
2. Jury Verdicts: Clear Error Review 
I propose that where a jury determines that a use is fair, appellate 
courts should not employ de novo review. They should instead defer to 
the factual inferences that the jury reached in the fair-use analysis, em-
ploying clear error as the standard of review. I therefore propose a dou-
ble standard: when a jury finds in favor of the copyright holder, the ap-
pellate court should review de novo, but when a jury finds in favor of the 




My proposal for clear error review of jury verdicts is consistent with 
the practice and rhetoric of some courts.
173
 For instance, in Compaq 
Computer Corp. v. Ergonome Inc.,
174
 the Fifth Circuit applied a clear 
  
 172. See FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a)(6) (“Findings of fact, whether based on oral or other evidence, 
must not be set aside unless clearly erroneous . . . .”). 
  I address the issue of whether fair use is properly characterized as an issue of fact, an issue 
of law, or a mixed question of fact and law in Judges Playing Jury: Constitutional Conflicts in 
Deciding Fair Use on Summary Judgment. Snow, supra note 1, at 492–518. Therein I conclude that 
it should be characterized as a question of fact. For the sake of argument, however, assuming that it 
was proper to characterize fair use as a mixed question of law and fact, this conclusion would not 
preclude my proposal for a clear error standard of review. As Professors Wright and Miller note: 
There is no uniform standard for reviewing mixed questions of law and fact. . . . It does 
not appear to be the case that mixed questions of law and fact are entirely outside the 
“clearly erroneous” rule. In a long line of cases courts have held that this rule limited ap-
pellate review of matters that certainly seem to contain both legal and factual elements. 
Thus the Supreme Court has treated as a question of fact, governed by Rule 52(a), an is-
sue whether a payment to a taxpayer was a “gift,” and lower federal courts have applied 
that principle to many other determinations relating to the tax laws. Other courts have ap-
plied the “clearly erroneous” rule to a tremendous variety of matters including: whether a 
party was guilty of laches; the existence and scope of an agency or fiduciary relationship; 
questions involving contracts, including the existence of a contract or its validity or ap-
plicability, whether the parties had been under a mutual mistake, the nature or character 
of an instrument, and even in some instances the interpretation of a written contract; the 
eligibility of an alien for naturalization; the danger of consumer confusion with regard to 
trademarks and tradenames; whether a transaction was fraudulent; the existence of sub-
ject matter or personal jurisdiction; and many other matters, as is exemplified by the cita-
tions in the note below. [Other matters “note[d] below” include: abandonment of trade-
mark; adequacy of records; apparent authority; attractive nuisance; buyer in ordinary 
course; clear and present danger; common-law marriage; conservation and endanger-
ment; damages; discrimination; employee relationship; holder in due course; indigency; 
intent; foreseeability; land use and tribal rights; mental competency; motivation; nature of 
goods; privity; refusal to bargain collectively; Rule 11; satisfaction of burden of proof; 
seaworthiness; secured creditor; status of corporation; voting rights; willful statutory vio-
lation.] 
9C WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 78, at 484, 486–98. 
 173. See, e.g., Compaq Computer Corp. v. Ergonome Inc., 387 F.3d 403, 410–11 (5th Cir. 
2004) (upholding jury verdict under clear error standard). In dicta, Judge Posner has pointed out that 
he sees no reason that courts have instituted “plenary review” (de novo review) in copyright cases 
dealing with fair use. United States v. Frederick, 182 F.3d 496, 499 (7th Cir. 1999). Cf. Anderson v. 
City of Bessemer, 470 U.S. 564, 580 (1985) (applying clear error review in context of reviewing 
mixed question of whether employer discriminated based on sex of employee—a question which 
turns on divergent discretionary opinion).  
 174. 387 F.3d 403 (5th Cir. 2004). 
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error standard to uphold a jury verdict that found a use to be fair.
175
 
There, Compaq Computer Corp. had allegedly copied portions of the 
copyright holder’s book regarding correct hand positions for typing.
176
 
The appellate court reviewed the jury verdict that had found Compaq’s 
use to be fair.
177
 In that review, Judge Jones of the Fifth Circuit explained 
that the standard of review required reversal only where “the [c]ourt be-
lieves that reasonable men could not arrive at a contrary verdict.”
178
 
Throughout her review, Judge Jones considered whether inferences in the 
fair-use analysis, which would favor Compaq, were reasonable infer-
ences for a jury to draw.
179
 Concluding that jurors could have drawn rea-




It is further noteworthy that Judge Posner has articulated a prefer-
ence for clear error review of fair use, albeit in dicta.
181
 While consider-
ing whether to implement de novo review of a trial judge’s ruling on the 
mixed question of whether evidence was inadmissibly privileged, Judge 
Posner noted that courts often refer to mixed questions—“such as fair 
use in a copyright case”—as applying de novo (or plenary) review.
182
 
Yet, he continued, such courts never explain why the issue merits de 
novo review.
183
 Judge Posner concluded that in the Seventh Circuit “the 
clear-error standard is the proper standard for appellate review of deter-
minations of mixed questions of fact and law.”
184
 This statement sug-
gests, then, that Judge Posner believes that fair use should be reviewed 
under a clear error standard.
185
 
A contrary position to this view is not immediately evident in case 
law. In reviewing fair use opinions, I have not found any cases where an 
appellate court overturned a jury’s verdict of fairness under a de novo 
  
 175. Compaq, 387 F.3d at 410–11. 
 176. Id. at 406. 
 177. Id. 
 178. Id. at 409 (alteration in original) (citing Rubinstein v. Adm’rs of the Tulane Educ. Fund, 
218 F.3d 392, 401 (5th Cir. 2000). 
 179. Id. at 410–11. 
 180. Id. at 411 (“The evidence presented at trial and the reasonable inferences therefrom, when 
viewed through the lens of the statutory fair use factors, support the jury’s fair use finding.”). 
 181. See United States v. Frederick, 182 F.3d 496, 499 (7th Cir. 1999). 
 182. See id. 
 183. Id. 
 184. Id. 
 185. See id. Judge Posner’s characterization of the review standard for fair use is consistent 
with his view of when courts should decide fair use on summary judgment—only where a reasona-
ble trier of fact could reach only one conclusion. See Ty, Inc. v. Publ’ns Int’l Ltd., 292 F.3d 512, 516 
(7th Cir. 2002) (“‘Fair use is a mixed question of law and fact,’ which means that it ‘may be re-
solved on summary judgment if a reasonable trier of fact could reach only one conclusion—but not 
otherwise.’” (quoting Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 560 (1985)). 
That said, in the Frederick case where Judge Posner suggested that fair use should be reviewed for 
clear error, he also referred to fair use as “a mixed question of nonconstitutional law and fact”—a 
characterization that I entirely disagree with. Compare 182 F.3d at 499 (emphasis added), with 
discussion supra Part III.B (arguing for de novo review of fair-use decisions favoring copyright 
holders). 
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standard. But this is unsurprising. The issue of the jury role begins long 
before the jury reaches its verdict. It begins with summary judgment pro-
ceedings where litigants might argue that fair use constitutes an issue of 
law for the judge. As I discuss in Part II, most trial courts treat fair use as 
a matter appropriate for judicial decision at summary judgment.
186
  
My proposal to apply a clear error standard to jury verdicts favoring 
fair users would appear to gain support from Professor Volokh, insofar as 
the jury verdict is a general one. In discussing independent review on the 
issue of substantial similarity, he recognizes that independent review will 
not work where the jury issues a general verdict of no infringement.
187
 
There are so many subsidiary factual issues in a copyright claim (e.g., 
independent creation and substantial similarity) that the court of appeals 
has no way to know the reason that a jury has decided against infringe-
ment.
188
 So even if the appellate court believes that a use should not be 
fair, it must defer to the jury’s general finding because other factual find-
ings, which are subject to clear error review, could have influenced the 
decision. 
Of course this reasoning would not apply where the jury has found a 
use to be fair as a special verdict.
189
 The question thus arises as to wheth-
er special verdicts of fairness should be reviewed de novo or for clear 
error. Professor Volokh argues for de novo review.
190
 On this point we 
disagree. Presumably Professor Volokh relies on the same arguments that 
he cites for independent review of bench trials: clarity of the law; fair-
ness to copyright holders; and serving the First Amendment purpose of 
encouraging speech.
191
 For reasons explained below, however, I find 
these arguments unpersuasive.
192
 The subsections below discuss reasons 
that independent review should not apply symmetrically where a fair user 
prevails at a jury trial. 
  
 186. E.g., Castle Rock Entm’t v. Carol Publ’g Grp., Inc., 955 F. Supp. 260, 272 (S.D.N.Y. 
1997) (deciding fair use on summary judgment despite recognizing that the reasonableness of con-
trary inferences which made her “decision a difficult one”), aff’d, 150 F.3d 132 (2d Cir. 1998); 
Television Digest, Inc. v. U.S. Tel. Ass’n, 841 F. Supp. 5, 9 (D.D.C. 1993) (expressly rejecting 
defendant’s argument that a fair use decision is improper on a motion for summary judgment). But 
see Harris v. San Jose Mercury News, No. C 04-05262 CRB, 2006 WL 995151, at *1 n.2 (N.D. Cal. 
Apr. 10, 2006) (“[T]he Court believes that inferences to be drawn [in the fair-use analysis] from 
undisputed facts are questions more appropriately resolved by a jury than a judge.”). 
 187. See Volokh & McDonnell, supra note 114, at 2442–43. 
 188. See id. 
 189. The same would be true under a general verdict if the only issue at trial surrounded fair 
use or if the other factual issues clearly could not have favored the defendant. 
 190. See Volokh & McDonnell, supra note 114, at 2442–43. Presumably, Professor Volokh 
makes no qualification for fair use. See supra note 166. 
 191. See Volokh & McDonnell, supra note 114, at 2442. 
 192. See discussion infra Part III.C.2.a–b. 
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a. Constitutional Considerations 
i. Speech Rights of Fair Users 
Under Bose, the justification for performing de novo review of a 
factual finding is to ensure protection of speech.
193
 In condemning a de-
fendant, a jury or judge could have overlooked the defendant’s right of 
speech, and so the appellate court is justified to review that finding with-
out deference. Yet when the defendant has prevailed at trial, a review 
that is broader than clear error would not seem to benefit the defendant 
speaker; plenary review would seem to create only a disadvantage for the 
defendant. Replacing the usual clear error standard with de novo would 
serve only to threaten the jury verdict that favored the defendant speaker. 
The justification, then, for Bose’s de novo exception to Rule 52(a) seems 
lacking: imposing de novo over the statutory mandate of clearly errone-
ous does not seem to better protect speech where the speaker has already 
prevailed at trial. It would seem, then, that clear error should govern in 
the situation where a jury finds for the fair user.
194
 
It might be argued, however, that independent review should govern 
even where the putative fair user has prevailed for the simple reason that 
judges better recognize speech than do juries.
195
 If the role of judges is to 
protect the constitutional right of speech, it would seem that judges 
should be better able to identify speech. And even if appellate judges 
reverse a jury finding favoring a defendant, the reversal will better define 
speech for future fair users. 
This argument is unpersuasive for two reasons.
196
 First, as a prelim-
inary matter, it is doubtful that judges can in fact better identify the 
speech nature of fair use than can juries. Second, clear error review rep-
resents a procedural form of breathing space that the speech nature of fair 
use requires. I discuss these reasons in greater detail below. 
  
 193. Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 505, 510–11 (1984). 
 194. Although Bose never expressly states that independent review applies only if the speaker 
loses at trial, its language suggests this application. See id. at 505, 509. The language describes 
independent review as applying “[i]n cases in which there is a claim of denial of rights under the 
Federal Constitution.” Id. at 509 (alteration in original) (emphasis added) (quoting Time, Inc. v. 
Pape, 401 U.S. 279, 284 (1971)). It describes its past practices of independent review as ensuring 
“that the speech in question actually falls within the unprotected category.” Id. at 505 (emphasis 
added). Also, it explains that independent review “imposes a special responsibility on judges when-
ever it is claimed that a particular communication is unprotected.” Id. (emphasis added). Cf. Hustler 
Magazine v. Fallwell, 485 U.S. 46, 57 (1988) (accepting jury finding without any analysis that 
defendant’s publication did not constitute a fact in test for libel); 2 RODNEY A. SMOLLA, LAW OF 
DEFAMATION § 12:85 (2010) (interpreting Hustler as lending implicit support for view that inde-
pendent review applies only where speaker does not prevail at the trial level). 
 195. See Volokh & McDonnell, supra note 114, at 2440 (arguing that an appellate court can 
determine whether two works are substantially similar just as well as a jury can). 
 196. See Snow, supra note 1, at 497–504. Analogously, a parent’s role to ensure the health and 
safety of children does not imply that the parent is better than a doctor at identifying a child’s state 
of health. To ensure protection of health, the parent facilitates an opportunity for the doctor to exam-
ine the sick child. Likewise, to ensure protection of speech, the judge facilitates an opportunity for 
the jury to examine the disputed use. 
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The first reason that judges should not review jury verdicts favoring 
defendants is that judges are not necessarily any better at identifying fair 
uses than are juries.
197
 Determining fairness rests on an understanding of 
cultural norms and social values. As Professor Lloyd Weinreb observes 
in his article, Fair’s Fair: A Comment on the Fair Use Doctrine, the ref-
erence to fairness suggests a normative element in the analysis, and that 
element is desirable.
198
 That element, Professor Weinreb continues, gives 
effect to the community’s established practices and understandings.
199
 If 
this is true, it would seem that the diversity of life experiences in a jury 
would better reflect the established practices and understandings of the 
community than would the single life experience of a judge.
200
 In identi-
fying the independent speech nature of repeated expression, the collec-
tive opinion of a disparate group of ordinary citizens would appear to be 




Admittedly, my intuition on this point may not be accurate. It could 
be that, at least in some situations, judges are better at determining fair-
ness than are juries. Any empirical attempt to prove that the jury is a 
better institution at identifying fairness would be unavailing, for such a 
study would require an omniscient knowledge of whether the judge or 
jury was in fact correct or incorrect. Even if a survey of copyright attor-
neys were to establish that defendants prefer juries to judges, this fact 
would suggest merely that juries are perceived to be more likely to find a 
use to be fair. It would not suggest that a jury would be more likely to 
actually make an accurate finding. Because ‘fairness’ is an inherently 
  
 197. See id. 
 198. Lloyd L. Weinreb, Fair’s Fair: A Comment on the Fair Use Doctrine, 103 HARV. L. REV. 
1137, 1161 (1990) (“The reference to fairness in the doctrine of fair use imparts to the copyright 
scheme a bounded normative element that is desirable in itself. It gives effect tot the community’s 
established practices and understandings and allows the location of copyright within the framework 
of property generally.”). 
 199. Id. 
 200. See id. The Court’s comment in Sioux City & Pacific Railroad v. Stout is instructive on 
this point: 
Twelve men of the average of the community, comprising men of education and men of 
little education, men of learning and men whose learning consists only in what they have 
themselves seen and heard, the merchant, the mechanic, the farmer, the laborer; these sit 
together, consult, apply their separate experience of the affairs of life to the facts proven, 
and draw a unanimous conclusion. This average judgment thus given it is the great effort 
of the law to obtain. It is assumed that twelve men know more of the common affairs of 
life than does one man, that they can draw wiser and safer conclusions from admitted 
facts thus occurring than can a single judge . . . .  
. . . . 
. . . [W]hen the facts are disputed, or when they are not disputed, but different minds 
might honestly draw different conclusions from them, the case must be left to the jury for 
their determination. 
84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 657, 664 (1873). 
 201. Cf. WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 78, at § 2585 (“This respect for the findings of fact by 
the trial court should not be pressed too far. It is simply wrong to say . . . that the ‘findings will be 
given the force and effect of a jury verdict.’” (quoting Stoody Co. v. Royer, 347 F.2d 672, 680 (10th 
Cir. 1967))). 
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subjective concept, it is not possible to empirically demonstrate my intui-
tion—that juries are the better institution at judging fairness.  
Yet my inability to produce evidence on this point should not be fa-
tal to my argument. My argument here is that proponents of de novo re-
view cannot establish that judges are better than juries. That is, I argue 
that the proponents must bear the burden to demonstrate the superiority 
of judges at determining fair use. And this makes sense: for two hundred 
years fair use was a jury issue,
202
 and furthermore, the Constitution artic-
ulates a preference for the jury.
203
 Any deviation from the well-
established practice of jury determination must be justified. It is therefore 
the proponents of de novo review who must justify that judges are better 
than juries at identifying fair uses. And they have not.  
Even assuming that judges are better able to identify fair-use 
speech, they should still not employ de novo review of jury verdicts that 
favor fair users. As I state above, a second reason supports clear error 
review: breathing space necessary to protect fair-use speech.
204
 To ensure 
the actual protection of speech that merits protection, the law must pro-
tect more than that which merits protection.
205
 It must protect unprotect-
ed speech at the margins to give the protected speech breathing space 
necessary for its exercise. Given the inherent uncertainty surrounding 
most—if not all—uses that are in fact fair, most fair-use expression lies 
at the margins of protected speech.
206
 So to protect fair-use speech at the 
margins, the law must protect speech that crosses the line; it must protect 
  
 202. E.g., Sayre v. Moore, (1785) 1 East 361, 362, (K.B.) (Lord Mansfield, C.J.) (“In all these 
[copyright cases where defendant had altered underlying work] the question of fact to come before a 
jury is, whether the alteration be colourable or not . . . ? [T]he jury will decide whether it be a servile 
imitation or not.”); DC Comics, Inc. v. Reel Fantasy, Inc., 696 F.2d 24, 28 (2d Cir. 1982) (reversing 
district court’s grant of summary judgment on the grounds that fair use raises “essentially factual 
issues and . . . are normally questions for the jury”); see also Snow, supra note 1, at 518. 
 203. See U.S. CONST. amend. VII; see also Snow, supra note 1, at 504–05. 
 204. A third reason may be cited as well. De novo review of jury findings of fairness (or un-
fairness) could possibly abolish any burden of proof. If appellate courts could decide fair use without 
any deference to a jury, so also could trial courts. See discussion infra Part IV.A. Trial courts have 
the same obligation as appellate courts to uphold constitutional rights (without deference to a jury), 
so trial courts could rule against fair users without deference to a jury in the same way that appellate 
courts could rule against fair users without deference to a jury. Fair use, then, would effectively 
become a constitutional issue solely for judges, much like the issue of whether an officer’s conduct 
was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Issues that rest with the sole decision-making authori-
ty of judges are legal issues. And legal issues usually do not entail a burden of proof: judges most 
often decide them without applying a presumption for either party. In the context of fair use, if the 
burden of proof were to rest with the party seeking to suppress fair-use speech—the copyright hold-
er—this could prove a formidable challenge in close cases. Although courts have recently departed 
from the historical judicial practice of placing that burden with copyright holders, First Amendment 
principles dictate that the burden should rest with copyright holders. See Snow, supra note 114, at 
1791–1807. Assuming that courts correctly place that burden with copyright holders, it would serve 
to provide procedural breathing space to fair users. See id. at 1807–14. 
 205. See generally Fed. Election Comm’n v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 468–69 
(2007) (“First Amendment freedoms need breathing space to survive.”) (quoting NAACP v. Button, 
371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963)). 
 206. See Snow, supra note 114, at 1784, 1799–1804. 
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some instances of infringement.
207




This principle of breathing space suggests a clear error standard of 
review.
209
 It seems indisputable that neither jury nor judge will in every 
case correctly decide whether a use is fair. Even assuming, for the sake 
of argument, that judges are better than juries at identifying fairness, no 
one would believe that judges are perfect.
210
 Indeed, it is well accepted 
that sometimes judges get it wrong.
211
 The possibility exists, then, that 
appellate judges might incorrectly label a fair use as infringing where a 
jury has found otherwise. This possibility the law must protect against, 
and the standard of review will offer that protection. Clear error would 
favor a finding of fair use over infringement, so that even if judges be-
lieved a jury incorrectly found a use to be fair, they could not reverse the 
finding without a compelling reason. On the other hand, clear error 
would result in some instances of infringement being upheld as fair. 
Clear error would serve to protect fair use at the cost of protecting some 
infringement. It would provide breathing space. 
This conclusion does not imply that an appellate court that must af-
firm a jury finding of fairness under the clear error standard could not 
provide guidance to future speakers. Certainly judges could still set forth 
legal principles to guide trial courts in formulating legal instructions to 
future juries, all while upholding a jury verdict of fairness under clear 
  
 207. Cf. id. at 1819–21 (discussing possibility that shifting burden of proof in fair use decisions 
could result in greater instances of infringement). 
 208. See id.; see also Wis. Right to Life, 551 U.S. at 468–69. 
 209. Perhaps most illustrative of this principle is the Court’s explanation in Waters v. Church-
ill:  
[I]t is important to ensure not only that the substantive First Amendment standards are 
sound, but also that they are applied through reliable procedures. This is why we have of-
ten held . . . a particular allocation of the burden of proof . . . to be constitutionally re-
quired in proceedings that may penalize protected speech. 
511 U.S. 661, 669 (1994). Cf. Snow, supra note 114, at 1781–82 (observing burden-of-proof proce-
dural protection to speakers in all speech contexts except fair use); Joseph P. Liu, Copyright and 
Breathing Space, 30 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 429, 438 (2007) (arguing that the Court should employ 
procedural rules to create First Amendment breathing space in copyright). 
 210. The mistaken nature of judges at assessing fair use (or the lack thereof) is perhaps best 
illustrated by the case histories of some of the most celebrated fair use decisions by the Supreme 
Court. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994), rev’g 972 F.2d 1429 (6th Cir. 
1992), rev’g 754 F. Supp. 1150 (M.D. Tenn. 1991); Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation En-
ters., 471 U.S. 539 (1985), rev’g 723 F.2d 195 (2d Cir. 1983), rev’g 557 F. Supp. 1067 (S.D.N.Y. 
1983); Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984), rev’g 659 F.2d 963 
(9th Cir. 1981), rev’g 480 F. Supp. 429 (C.D. Cal. 1979). 
 211. Judge Pierre Leval observes:  
Judges do not share a consensus on the meaning of fair use. Earlier decisions provide lit-
tle basis for predicting later ones. Reversals and divided courts are commonplace. The 
opinions reflect widely differing notions of the meaning of fair use. Decisions are not 
governed by consistent principles, but seem rather to result from intuitive reactions to in-
dividual fact patterns.  
Leval, supra note 128, at 1106–07. 
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 Judges could still opine in dicta that the use at issue is—in the 
judge’s view—infringing, teaching future speakers about the contours of 
copyright.
213
 Clear error would not preclude appellate judges from articu-
lating principles that identify the presence or absence of fair use. In ef-
fect, judges could change the boundaries—just not the breathing space 
around those boundaries. 
Thus, the standard of review in fair use should exist to minimize the 
possibility of erroneously denying protected speech—not to minimize the 
possibility of erroneously deciding the issue either way. The goal of clar-
ifying the law to aid a fact-finder in correctly identifying speech should 
not diminish the ultimate goal of protecting that speech. And to protect 
speech, the standard of review should facilitate a finding of fair use 
whenever either the jury or the judge favors that finding. Accordingly, 
appellate courts should both defer to a jury’s finding of fairness and ig-
nore a jury’s finding of infringement. Stated another way, clear error 
review should govern where a fair user has prevailed; de novo review 
should govern where a copyright holder has prevailed. 
Paradoxically, my argument up to this point relies on the same free 
speech principle to reach seemingly contrary conclusions: I argue that 
free speech requires both de novo and clear error review. It may seem, 
then, that I employ the First Amendment opportunistically, only when it 
serves my seemingly biased interest in furthering fair use. It should be 
asked, then, whether I have ignored speech considerations in favor of 
copyright holders. Yes, I have—up to this point. In the section below, 
however, I consider speech interests that support copyright holders.
214
 
ii. Speech Rights of Copyright Holders 
This proposal to asymmetrically perform independent review to the 
benefit of fair users over copyright holders seems to ignore the principle 
that copyright serves First Amendment values as much as, if not more 
than, fair use. As the Supreme Court pointed out in Eldred v. Ashcroft,
215
 
“[C]opyright supplies the economic incentive to create and disseminate 
ideas,” its very purpose being “to promote the creation and publication of 
free expression.”
216
 Denying copyright holders the benefit of independent 
  
 212. See discussion supra Part III.C.2.a.1 (explaining that error does not preclude a court from 
declaring legal principles that should guide similar situations in the future). 
 213. See discussion infra Part III.C.2.b (explaining that judges can declare legal principle to 
guide future decision even while affirming under a clear error standard). 
 214. I thank Professor Dotan Oliar for this consideration that he raised while commenting on a 
previous draft of my article at the Fourth Annual Junior Scholars in Intellectual Property Workshop, 
held at Michigan State University College of Law. 
 215. 537 U.S. 186 (2003). 
 216. The Court rejected the argument that copyright is subject to a speech restrictive analysis 
based on the following:  
The Copyright Clause and First Amendment were adopted close in time. This proximity 
indicates that, in the Framers’ view, copyright’s limited monopolies are compatible with 
free speech principles. Indeed, copyright’s purpose is to promote the creation and publi-
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review might increase the cost of protecting their protected speech, i.e., 
copyrighted expression. It is therefore arguable that independent review 
should apply where fair users prevail to protect the speech of copyright 
holders.  
This argument seems to draw strength from First Amendment theo-
ry. If the purpose of freedom of speech is to give rise to a robust market-
place of ideas that ultimately produces human enlightenment, then the 
role of the Free Speech Clause should be to engender ideas and their 
expression.
217
 Independent review of decisions favoring fair users would 
seem to serve that end: it would offer greater protection to copyright 
holders, which would facilitate an increase in the production of copy-
righted expression. Similarly, it is thought that copyright facilitates a 
means for realizing individual autonomy
218
 and exercising freedom of 
imagination.
219
 Thus, asymmetric application of independent review 
seems inconsistent with these theoretical purposes underlying the Free 
Speech Clause. 
It is true that the proposal for asymmetric application of independ-
ent review might reduce production of copyrighted expression, which 
would disserve the goals of First Amendment speech theories. But this 
fact suggests only that a tension exists between over-enforcement of fair 
use and the Free Speech Clause. It does not suggest that the tension be-
tween fair use and the Free Speech Clause is greater than, or even com-
parable to, the tension between copyright and the Free Speech Clause.
220
 
And in fact, the copyright tension appears much greater than the fair-use 
tension: copyright appears to pose a greater threat to free speech than 
does fair use. Two reasons support this conclusion. First, the stakes are 
much higher for fair users who contemplate an erroneous judgment than 
they are for copyright holders.
221
 Fair users face a penalty that both en-
  
cation of free expression. As Harper & Row observed: “[T]he Framers intended copy-
right itself to be the engine of free expression. By establishing a marketable right to the 
use of one’s expression, copyright supplies the economic incentive to create and dissemi-
nate ideas.” 
Id. at 219 (alteration in original) (quoting Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 
539, 558 (1985)). 
 217. See generally Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) 
(“[T]he ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas . . . .”); RODNEY A. SMOLLA, 
SMOLLA AND NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH: A TREATISE ON THE FIRST AMENDMENT §2:20 
(2011) (articulating marketplace theory). 
 218. See generally C. EDWIN BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH (1989). 
 219. See Jed Rubenfeld, The Freedom of Imagination: Copyright’s Constitutionality, 112 
YALE L.J. 1, 37–48 (2002). 
 220. Nor does this fact suggest that any sort of abridgment has occurred. See U.S. CONST. 
amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech . . . .” (emphasis add-
ed)). Weakening the incentive of copyright holders to speak should not constitute an abridgment, for 
otherwise, so would repealing the Copyright Act itself, as would repealing a law requiring the filing 
of income-tax returns. 
 221. See Snow, supra note 114, at 1817 (concluding that disparity in outcomes that fair users 
and copyright holders respectively face when each contemplates an erroneous judgment distin-
 
File: SNOW_FINAL_To_Darby-4.doc Created on: 5/2/2012 6:00:00 PM Last Printed: 5/23/2012 7:23:00 PM 
2011] FAIR USE AS A MATTER OF LAW 33 
 
joins their speech and inflicts financial punishment;
222
 copyright holders 
face a denial of rent due for the use of their property.
223
 Second, the pro-
cedural landscape already favors copyright holders.
224
 A fair user must 
demonstrate the legitimacy of his use: an admitted use is an infringing 
use unless the fair user can persuade the fact-finder otherwise.
225
 Where 
uncertainty prevents that persuasion, copyright holders automatically 
win.
226
 And uncertainty always accompanies the question of fairness.
227
 
Procedurally, free speech in the form of copyrighted expression enjoys a 
great advantage over free speech in the form of fair-use expression.  
Accordingly, the fact that a tension may exist between fair use and 
the Free Speech Clause does not suggest that courts should apply inde-
pendent review symmetrically. In practice, the tension that exists be-
tween copyright and the Free Speech Clause is much greater. This dis-
parity between tensions suggests that independent review should apply 
asymmetrically so as to disfavor the copyright holder—the litigant whose 
interest lies in greatest tension with the Free Speech Clause.  
It should further be noted that a fallacy exists in the argument that 
copyright as speech merits as much protection as fair use. The fallacy 
becomes apparent when considering the meaning of protection. Protec-
tion of what? Copyright holders seek protection of their rights to exclude 
others from using expression. Fair users seek protection of their rights to 
express themselves by using another’s expression. Stated differently, 
copyright holders seek protection of property; fair users seek protection 
of speech. This understanding implies that an argument that copyright 
holders should be protected by strengthening their ability to enforce cop-
yright is a property argument. It is not a speech argument. The argument 
is fallacious that purports that speech rights of copyright holders demand 
the same protection as speech rights of fair users: copyright holders 
claim protection of property rights, which are subservient to the speech 
rights of fair users. Independent review applies asymmetrically to protect 
the speech rights at issue—those, and only those, of the fair user. 
  
guishes the chilling effects of those respective outcomes on the production of fair-use material and 
copyrighted material). 
 222. See 17 U.S.C. § 504 (2006). 
 223. See Snow, supra note 114, at 1817. 
 224. See id. at 1781. 
 225. See Chi. Bd. of Educ. v. Substance, Inc., 354 F.3d 624, 629 (7th Cir. 2003) (“The burden 
of proof is on the copier because fair use is an affirmative defense . . . .” (citing Campbell v. Acuff-
Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 588 (1994))); Snow, supra note 114, at 1787–91 (discussing effect 
of placing burden of proof on fair user). 
 226. See Snow, supra note 114, at 1790–91. 
 227. See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 588 (1985) (“[T]he 
endless variety of situations and combinations of circumstances that can arise in particular cases 
precludes the formulation of exact rules in the [fair use] statute.” (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 94-176, at 
66 (1976))); see also Leval, supra note 128, at 1106–07 (observing confusion among judges as to the 
meaning of fair use); Snow, supra note 114, at 1790–91. 
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A final argument for symmetric application based on the speech 
rights of the copyright holder is that an erroneous finding of fair use 
might force the copyright holder to speak when he prefers to remain si-
lent.
228
 This argument, however, is unavailing.
229
 It is questionable 
whether copyright holders are speaking when others use their expression. 
Likewise, it is questionable that using their already-published expression 
forces them to speak given that they have already chosen to speak it. 
Finally, constitutional jurisprudence calls into question a law that forces 
speech only if a threat of punishment is present (e.g., imprisonment, 
fines, taxes, or an injunction); copyright holders do not face such a threat 
when someone uses their expression.
230
 
b. Policy Consideration of Certainty  
Aside from constitutional considerations, the policy reason of 
providing greater certainty for litigants should be considered in contem-
plating the standard of review. It may seem that symmetric application 
would facilitate greater certainty in fair use. After all, symmetric applica-
tion would allow an appellate court to rule as a matter of law regardless 
of whether a fair user prevailed at trial, and more opportunities to rule as 
a matter of law would seem to bring more clarity to the doctrine.
231
 By 
contrast, if appellate courts may perform independent review only 
asymmetrically, the cases in which they may rule as a matter of law seem 
limited. Under clear error review, an affirmance would mean merely that 
the jury drew reasonable inferences; the appellate court’s holding would 
not speak to whether the same conduct in the future would be considered 
fair. The possibility of inconsistency would give rise to uncertainty. 
This possibility appears unlikely because, as noted above, the 
asymmetric proposal would not require courts to cease ruling as a matter 
of law on appellate review when affirming under clear error (or, of 
course, when reversing under clear error).
232
 In affirming a jury finding, 
an appellate court may articulate legal principles to guide future fact-
finders. Indeed, if the court so chooses, the basis for its conclusion that 
there is no clear error may be that the use is fair as a matter of law.
233
 The 
standard of review speaks only to the floor for affirming a judgment; it 
  
 228. See Harper, 471 U.S. at 559–60 (recognizing that copyright serves “the right to refrain 
from speaking at all” (quoting Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977))). 
 229. The Court’s comment in Harper recognizing that copyright serves the First Amendment 
value of refraining from speaking was made in the context of examining the right of first publica-
tion—not the right of subsequent uses. See id. 
 230. See Axson-Flynn v. Johnson, 356 F.3d 1277, 1291 (10th Cir. 2004). 
 231. Cf. Volokh & McDonnell, supra note 114, at 2442 (citing certainty as a reason for apply-
ing independent review in the context of the substantial-similarity inquiry). 
 232. See discussion supra Part III.C.2.a.i (explaining that clear error does not preclude a court 
from declaring legal principles that should guide similar situations in the future). 
 233. See, e.g., Triangle Publ’ns, Inc. v. Knight-Ridder Newspapers, Inc., 626 F.2d 1171, 1175 
n.11 (5th Cir. 1980) (ruling as a matter of law that defendant’s use was fair, and contemplating that 
applicable standard could be clearly erroneous).  
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does not speak to the ceiling.
234
 Courts could still rule as a matter of law 
under a clear error standard. 
The argument against the proposal for asymmetry is also questiona-
ble for the simple reason that uncertainty, to an extent, should be pre-
served in fair use. Uncertainty allows flexibility.
235
 To preserve flexibil-
ity, courts have always preached that a fundamental tenant of fair use is 
that each use raises its own considerations of fairness.
236
 Each use poten-
tially raises circumstances that could represent an element of speech re-
quiring protection.
237
 Through case-by-case analyses, fair use necessarily 
limits the precedential value of any inferences drawn in a particular anal-
ysis.
238
 Inferences drawn in one case are not binding on a subsequent 
case.
239
 Procedures governing fair use, then, should not assay to eradicate 
the doctrine of uncertainty.  
  
 234. See FED. R. CIV. P. 52(a)(6) (stating standard for reversal of factual finding in terms of 
necessary circumstance, i.e., clearly erroneous findings). Of course the technical holding of an 
affirmance under a clear error standard is that the evidence supports the jury’s finding, and nothing 
more than that. See generally WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 78 § 2585 at 405–06 (explaining the 
meaning of the clearly erroneous standard and the mistake of inferring anything beyond that mean-
ing). But it seems improbable that future courts would ignore language that declares legal principles 
in an affirming opinion. E.g., Sony Computer Entm’t Am., Inc. v. Bleem, LLC, 214 F.3d 1022, 1027 
(9th Cir. 2000) (relying on Triangle Publ’ns, 626 F.2d at 1175 n.11, for propositions of law that the 
Triangle court articulated in affirming fair use finding, despite fact that the Triangle court stated that 
the governing legal standard might be clear error); Pro Arts, Inc. v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., No. 85-
3022, 1986 WL 16647 at *1 (6th Cir. March 25, 1986) (same). If the appellate court makes clear in 
its opinion that the use must be viewed as fair as a matter of law, a future court contemplating simi-
lar facts would know that a finding of infringement would result in clear error. As a practical matter, 
an appellate affirmance under a clear error standard may still give license to future trial courts to 
conclude that a use is fair as a matter of law. 
 235. See Ned Snow, The Forgotten Right of Fair Use, 62 CASE W. RES. L. REV. (forthcoming 
2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1659855, at 5 (“Uncertainty, then, is unavoidable—
indeed, even intentional—in the doctrine of fair use, for uncertainty allows flexibility and a breadth 
of application.”). 
 236. See, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994) (noting that fair 
use requires a case-by-case analysis); Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 344 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 
4901) (describing the process of determining whether an unauthorized copy constitutes fair use as 
“the metaphysics of the law, where the distinctions are, or at least may be, very subtile and refined, 
and sometimes, almost evanescent”). 
 237. Cf. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219, 221 (2003) (describing fair use as a “free 
speech safeguard[]” and a “First Amendment accommodation[]”); Campbell, 510 U.S. at 577. 
 238. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 577 (explaining that fair use calls for case-by-case analysis); 
see also Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 560 (1985) (explaining that 
each fair use case “must be decided on its own facts” (citation omitted)). 
 239. See Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930) (Hand, J.) (“[A]s 
soon as literal appropriation ceases to be the test [for copyright infringement], the whole matter is 
necessarily at large, so that, as what recently well said by a distinguished judge, the decisions cannot 
help much in a new case.” (citation omitted)). Compare Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 
(1919) (Holmes, J.) (“[T]he character of every act depends upon the circumstances in which it is 
done. The most stringent protection of free speech would not protect a man in falsely shouting fire in 
a theatre and causing a panic.” (citing Aikens v. Wisconsin, 195 U.S. 194, 205–06 (1904))), with 
Simms v. Stanton, 75 F. 6, 10 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1896) (“What would be a ‘fair use‘ in one case might 
not be in another.”). Cf. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 26 n.9 (1973) (noting that even if juries 
may reach different conclusions as to whether expression merits speech protection in the obscenity 
context, constitutionals rights are not abridged because “one of the consequences we accept under 
our jury system” is that “different juries may reach different results” (quoting Roth v. United States, 
354 U.S. 476, 492 n.30 (1957)). 
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The point at which flexibility should be sacrificed for certainty by 
ruling as a matter of law is an issue for appellate courts to discern. Thus 
far, for instance, appellate courts have chosen to establish as a matter of 
law the process for determining fairness when a user records a television 
show on a VCR for subsequent home use;
240
 however, they have chosen 
to leave open the question of fairness when musicians employ portions of 
another artist’s song in a seemingly parodic style.
241
 An asymmetric 
standard of review would not preclude courts from continuing to discern 
when it is appropriate to rule as a matter of law. Except in one situa-
tion—where judge and jury disagree. Specifically, where an appellate 
court believes that a use should be infringing, but it views a jury’s find-
ing of fairness as not clearly erroneous, the clear error standard would 
prevent the court from ruling as a matter of law that the use is infring-
ing.
242
 And this is as it should be.
243
 Uses over which reasonable minds 
disagree should lie in the grey.
244
 It gives breathing space to those uses 
that lie at the margins of fairness.
245
 Hence, those uses that a jury would 
recognize as fair but an appellate court would rebuke as infringing 
should be spared the condemnation of endless banishment as a matter of 
law. 
D. Decisions on Summary Judgment 
Up to this point, I have addressed appellate review of bench trials 
and jury trials. The question remains regarding the standard to apply in 
reviewing the factual inferences of fair use at summary judgment. The 
answer to this question is de novo—the same standard that applies in 
reviewing any matter decided on summary judgment.
246
 For the same 
reason that appellate courts should review bench trials de novo, appellate 
courts should review summary judgments de novo: a single trial judge is 
  
 240. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 447–55 (1984). 
Likewise, Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 487 F.3d 701, 709 (9th Cir. 2007), and Kelly v. 
Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811, 817–22 (9th Cir. 2003), must be relevant for future cases that 
contemplate the fairness of posting thumbnail images on a search engine. 
 241. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 589 (“In parody, as in news reporting, context is everything, 
and the question of fairness asks what else the parodist did besides go to the heart of the original.” 
(citation omitted)). 
 242. The Seventh Circuit well defined the process of finding clear error as follows: “To be 
clearly erroneous, a decision must strike us as more than just maybe or probably wrong; it must . . . 
strike us as wrong with the force of a five-week-old, unrefrigerated dead fish.” Parts & Elec. Motors, 
Inc. v. Sterling Elec., Inc., 866 F.2d 228, 233 (7th Cir. 1988). 
 243. See Weinreb, supra note 198, at 1161 (criticizing the approach of providing a more defi-
nite and manageable doctrine of fair use). 
 244. See Snow, supra note 235, at 5. 
 245. Cf. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579 (1994) (explaining that fair use must guarantee “breathing 
space within the confines of copyright”). 
 246. E.g., Graham v. Long Island R.R., 230 F.3d 34, 38 (2d Cir. 2000) (“We review a grant of 
summary judgment de novo applying the same standard as the district court.” (citing Belfi v. Pren-
dergast, 191 F.3d 129, 135 (2d. Cir. 1999))). Because witness credibility is not at issue on summary 
judgment, three judges on appeal are three times as qualified to offer their opinion of fairness as is 
one judge on summary judgment. For the same reason, then, that de novo should govern a bench 
trial, de novo should govern summary judgment. See discussion supra Part III.C.1. 
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in no better position to determine a use’s fairness than are three appellate 
judges. 
Yet in reviewing summary judgment decisions de novo, appellate 
courts must be careful not to rule as they otherwise might in other mat-
ters before them on summary judgment. Specifically, they should not 
reverse the summary judgment and rule as a matter of law for the copy-
right holder—as they have at times done in the past.
247
 In Part IV below, 
I explain that trial courts should employ summary judgment only in favor 
of fair users.
248
 Assuming that trial courts follow my proposal in Part IV, 
an appellate court’s review of summary judgments will be limited to 
those that favor fair users. In reviewing those decisions, if the appellate 
court reverses the summary judgment for the fair user, it should not rule 
as a matter of law that the use is infringing. For the reasons that trial 
courts should refrain from ruling on summary judgment for copyright 
holders, which I detail in Part IV below, appellate courts should also so 
refrain. A reversal of summary judgment, then, should only deny the fair 
user the opportunity to prevail as a matter of law before a judge; it should 
not deny the fair user the right to prevail as a matter of fact before a jury. 
IV. TRIAL COURT ADJUDICATION 
As a general matter, the law recognizes some circumstances that al-
low judges to decide factual issues as a matter of law.
249
 For instance, a 
judge may decide a factual issue on summary judgment where the judge 
believes that a reasonable jury could reach only one finding.
250
 The ques-
tion that follows is whether fair use, as a factual issue normally for the 
jury to decide, may be decided as a matter of law by a trial judge. I an-
swer this question in the affirmative by explaining the particular circum-
stances that should or should not allow for judges to decide fair use as a 
matter of law. Specifically, I propose that judges should rule on summary 
judgment whenever they believe that a use is fair. I further propose that 
judges should refrain from ruling—except in the most blatant of circum-
stances—on summary judgment in favor of copyright holders. In short, I 
  
 247. See, e.g., Infinity Broad. Corp. v. Kirkwood, 150 F.3d 104, 111–12 (2d Cir. 1998) (ruling 
for copyright holder on summary judgment, thereby reversing district court’s grant of summary 
judgment for defendant on fair use, and foreclosing opportunity for jury to find fair use); Marcus v. 
Rowley, 695 F.2d 1171, 1174–79 (9th Cir. 1983) (reversing district court’s dismissal of the copy-
right holder’s infringement claim, and in so doing, rejecting fair user’s argument by entering sum-
mary judgment for copyright holder). 
 248. The Article contemplates summary judgment for copyright holders in only the most 
obvious of circumstances, i.e., where fair use is not even arguable. See discussion infra Part IV.B.2. 
 249. See, e.g., Oravec v. Sunny Isles Luxury Ventures, L.C., 527 F.3d 1218, 1223 (11th Cir. 
2008) (“[N]on-infringement may be determined as a matter of law on a motion for summary judg-
ment [on grounds that] no reasonable jury, properly instructed, could find that the two works are 
substantially similar.” (quoting Herzong v. Castle Rock Entm’t, 193 F.3d 1241, 1247 (11th Cir. 
1999) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Containment Techs. Grp., Inc. v. Am. Soc’y 
of Health Sys. Pharmacists, No. 1:07-cv-0997-DFH-TAB, 2009 WL 838549, at *8 (S.D. Ind. March 
26, 2009) (applying Bose standard of constitutional speech protection on summary judgment). 
 250. See Oravec, 527 F.3d at 1223. 
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argue for an extraordinary practice of summary judgment: an asymmetric 
application that favors fair users.  
A. Summary Judgment for Fair Users 
It would seem that the constitutional obligation underlying the doc-
trine of independent review should apply as much to trial judges as it 
does to appellate judges.
251
 If an appellate court is constitutionally obli-
gated to conduct an independent review of facts, it would seem that a 
trial court must also, for trial courts are as obligated to protect constitu-
tional rights as appellate courts are.
252
 Therefore, a trial court’s obligation 
to protect a fair user’s constitutional right of speech suggests that the trial 
court may rule for a fair user as a matter of law. A trial court that be-
lieves that a factual finding of infringement would encroach on a consti-
tutional right of a fair user should be obligated to uphold that constitu-
tional right by overturning, or preventing, that finding. Accordingly, trial 
courts should rule as a matter of law on the issue of fair use where doing 
so would serve to protect the fair user’s right of speech. Where a trial 
court believes that a use is fair, a fair user’s constitutional right to speak 
requires the court to rule as a matter of law that the use is fair. 
Because independent review calls for a de novo standard—where 
appellate courts determine fairness without any deference to the reasona-
bleness of jury findings—it would seem that trial courts examining the 
issue of fairness under the doctrine of independent review also would 
perform that examination without any deference to the reasonableness of 
jury findings. That is, the rationale for independent review suggests that 
a trial court’s conclusion that a use is fair should be realized even if the 
court recognizes that reasonable jurors might disagree. If the court be-
lieves the use should be fair, even where it recognizes that reasonable 
minds might differ, the court’s obligation to protect the fair user’s speech 
should allow the court to rule as a matter of law that the use is fair.
253
 
Under the constitutional obligation to protect fair-use speech, then, 
the fairness of a use could be found at summary judgment as a pure issue 
of law. But this constitutional justification supports only a summary 
judgment ruling that favors fair users.
254
 As I discuss above in Part III, 
the constitutional rationale for independent review suggests an asymmet-
ric application of de novo review; therefore, in the trial context, that ra-
tionale suggests that summary judgment based on a judge’s constitution-
  
 251. See Volokh & McDonnell, supra note 114, at 2443–44. 
 252. See, e.g., Quantum Elecs. Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 881 F. Supp. 753, 767–
69 (D.R.I. 1995) (applying Bose standard of constitutional speech protection on summary judgment); 
Containment Techs., 2009 WL 838549, at *18 (S.D. Ind. 2009) (same). 
 253. See, e.g., Containment Techs., 2009 WL 838549, at *18 (granting summary judgment 
under Bose on grounds that reasonable jury could find for speaker). 
 254. E.g., Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley Ltd., 386 F. Supp. 2d 324, 327–33 
(S.D.N.Y. 2005) (granting defendant summary judgment based on fair use of copyright holder’s rock 
music posters in biographical book), aff’d, 448 F.3d 605 (2d Cir. 2006). 
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al obligation only applies to summary judgment decisions that favor fair 
users. 
This is not to say, though, that ruling for copyright holders on sum-
mary judgment—under the usual summary judgment standard—is inap-
propriate. That question I examine in the next section. The extent of the 
argument in this section is that summary judgment based on the constitu-
tional obligation to protect speech, which would justify a judge in ruling 
summarily even where she recognized that reasonable minds might disa-
gree, should only be employed in favor of fair users. This one-sided ap-
plication of the constitutional obligation appears justified for the same 
reason that it is justified in the appellate context: independent judicial 
review at both the trial and appellate levels protects a fair user’s speech 
right to the extent that it avoids an erroneous jury finding against the fair 
user.
255
 By contrast, summary judgment favoring a copyright holder 
would deny the fair user an opportunity for the jury to recognize the 
speech nature of the use. In short, the speech right of the fair user gives 
her two bites at the apple (the judge and the jury); the property right of 
the copyright holder gives her one bite at the apple (the jury). 
The Seventh Amendment strengthens this argument for asymmetric 
application of summary judgment in favor of fair users.
256
 I have argued 
elsewhere that the Seventh Amendment demands that the issue of fair 
use be decided by a jury: either litigant has a Seventh Amendment argu-
ment that fair use should go to a jury.
257
 The only justification that would 
excuse a court in ignoring this Seventh Amendment argument would be 
that a more important constitutional right needs protection.
258
 Disregard-
ing a copyright holder’s demand for a jury may be constitutionally justi-
fied on the grounds that the more important constitutional right of speech 
needs protection from a jury. That is, protecting the fair user’s right of 
speech would justify a trial court ignoring a copyright holder’s constitu-
tional right to a jury. Only because the First Amendment requires inde-
pendent review may the trial court ignore the copyright holder’s Seventh 
Amendment right by deciding as a matter of law that the use is fair. Yet 
  
 255. See discussion, supra Part III.C.2.a.i. 
 256. See U.S. CONST. amend. VII (“[N]o fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise reexamined in 
any Court of the United States.”). 
 257. Snow, supra note 1, at 544–53. 
 258. I thank Professor Mark Lemley for this consideration that he raised while commenting on 
a previous draft of my article at the Fourth Annual Junior Scholars in Intellectual Property Work-
shop, held at Michigan State University College of Law. Professor Lemley keenly noted a constitu-
tional tension in my argument that is based on both the First and Seventh Amendments; i.e., the 
Seventh Amendment usually serves as a basis for directing an issue to the jury whereas the First 
Amendment usually serves as the basis for removing an issue from the jury. Although this tension 
exists, it is not fatal to my argument. On the one hand, as I explain in the passage above, the Seventh 
Amendment constitutional interest of a copyright holder is less important than the First Amendment 
interest of a fair user. On the other hand, the Seventh Amendment interest of the fair user is more 
important than the First Amendment interest of a copyright holder. See Part III.C.2.a.ii (discussing 
speech interests of copyright holder). In other words, I resolve the tension by prioritizing the consti-
tutional rights at issue under the distinct circumstances contemplated. 
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ignoring the Seventh Amendment right is not so justified if the trial court 
believes that a use is not fair. A denial of a defendant’s Seventh Amend-
ment right where the judge believed the use to be infringing cannot be 
justified on the grounds that the judge is protecting the fair user’s right of 
speech, for ruling against a fair user does not protect his speech. There-
fore, to decide against a fair user on summary judgment would be to de-
ny the constitutional right to a jury without any justifiable reason.
259
 
Thus, the obligation of courts to protect constitutional rights, which 
gives rise to the doctrine of independent review, implies that trial courts 
may rule as a matter of law that a use is fair, independent of whether a 
reasonable jury would disagree. It appears that a trial court may, under 
specific circumstances, treat fair use as a pure issue of law appropriate 
for summary judgment. Fair use decided on summary judgment—as a 
pure issue of law—is appropriate where the court would rule for fair us-
ers, but it is not appropriate where the court would rule against fair users.  
B. Prohibition of Summary Judgment for Copyright Holders 
Although I argue that a trial court may not rule as a matter of law 
for a copyright holder under the doctrine of independent review, this 
argument does not imply that a trial court may not rule as a matter of law 
for a copyright holder in any situation.
260
 Absent reason otherwise, the 
usual standards for judgment as a matter of law and summary judgment 
should apply;
261
 and both doctrines allow a trial court to rule for a litigant 
as a matter of law where the court concludes that a reasonable jury would 
reach only one finding.
262
 Arguably, then, it would seem that a trial court 
may rule as a matter of law for copyright holders where, in the court’s 
view, no reasonable jury could find the use to be fair. 
It is true that the no-reasonable-jury standard for ruling as a matter 
of law is entrenched in American jurisprudence.
263
 But there is good rea-
son to depart from that standard in the context of deciding fair use cases. 
When the Supreme Court explained the no-reasonable-jury standard on 
summary judgment in Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
264
 the Court qualified 
that standard as applying in the “run-of-the-mill civil case.”
265
 Fair use is 
  
 259. The denial of the defendant’s jury right cannot be justified on the grounds that the court is 
protecting the copyright holder’s right of speech, for the copyright holder’s right of speech is not 
threatened in a copyright suit. See discussion supra Part III.C.2.a.ii. 
 260. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250–53 (1986). 
 261. See FED. R. CIV. P. 50(a), 56. 
 262. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250–53 (explaining that inquiry under the “genuine issue” 
standard of summary judgment is the same for the “reasonable jury” standard of a directed verdict, 
and that one “mirrors” the other); WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 78, at § 2532, at 484–85 (recogniz-
ing judicial popularity of equating the reasonableness standard for ruling as a matter of law under 
Rule 50(a) with standard for summary judgment under Rule 56). 
 263. See generally WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 78, at § 2532. 
 264. 477 U.S. 242 (1986). 
 265. The Anderson Court qualified its reasonable-jury standard for ruling on summary judg-
ment as follows:  
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not a run-of-the-mill civil case. Fair use represents an especially difficult 
subject matter to ascertain, and, as a result, it may be difficult for judges 
to accurately assess whether a jury would find inferences of fairness to 
be reasonable.
266
 Add to this the fact that the jury determination is inte-
gral to determining a speech right, and fair use stands apart from the run-




1. Uncertainty of Judicial Adequacy at Assessing Fairness 
Even accepting the fact that fair use is not the run-of-the-mill civil 
case, it is arguable that judges should still be able to apply the no-
reasonable-jury standard in favor of copyright holders. If fair use in truth 
represents an issue that is especially difficult for judges to predict wheth-
er a reasonable jury could find a use to be fair, this would seem to sug-
gest merely that judges should not apply the no-reasonable-jury standard 
when they are not sure whether a jury would find the use to be fair; it 
does not seem to suggest that they should not apply the standard when 
they are sure. Judges, it is arguable, are at least sufficiently competent to 
assess when no reasonable jury would find a use to be fair.  
This argument assumes that a judge’s view of what a reasonable ju-
ry would find is accurate. But this assumption is questionable. The infer-
ences in the fair-use analysis often turn on social value judgments that 
vary with extremity from one person to another.
268
 Simply put, subjectiv-
ity may color not only a judge’s perception of whether an inference is the 
most reasonable, but also her perception of whether an inference is at all 
reasonable. The likelihood of an inaccurate perception of the reasonable 
jury varies according to the degree of subjectivity involved in the judg-
ment itself. And fair use often appears to raise subjective questions.
269
  
For instance, in Clean Flicks of Colorado v. Soderbergh,
270
 the 
judge believed that no reasonable jury could find that the defendant’s 
editing service of movies, which entailed removing indecent conduct 
from movies without causing any harm to the market for the copyrighted 
  
If the defendant in a run-of-the-mill civil case moves for summary judgment or for a di-
rected verdict based on the lack of proof of a material fact, the judge must ask himself not 
whether he thinks the evidence unmistakably favors one side or the other but whether a 
fair-minded jury could return a verdict for the plaintiff on the evidence presented. . . . The 
judge's inquiry, therefore, unavoidably asks whether reasonable jurors could find by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the plaintiff is entitled to a verdict . . . . 
477 U.S. at 250–53 (emphasis added). 
 266. See discussion, supra Part III.C.2.a.i. 
 267. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252. 
 268. See, e.g., Infinity Broad. Corp. v. Kirkwood, 150 F.3d 104, 108–12 (2d Cir. 1998) (revers-
ing district court’s grant of summary judgment for defendant and precluding defendant from trying 
issue of fair use to jury). 
 269. See Snow, supra note 1, at 497–501. 
 270. 433 F. Supp. 2d 1236 (D. Colo. 2006). 
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movies, would constitute a fair use. 
271
 Although the question of fairness 
there was apparently highly subjective, the judge believed that no rea-
sonable jury could find otherwise.
272
 I believe that a reasonable jury 
could have: the defendants were encouraging the sale of the copyrighted 
works by editing them, and the defendant’s editing was, in a sense, a 
criticism of the underlying moral content.
273
 
Or consider Infinity Broadcast Corp. v. Kirkwood.
274
 The defendant, 
Kirkwood, transmitted radio broadcasts over the phone to its customers 
without the permission of the copyright holder of those broadcasts, Infin-
ity.
275
 At summary judgment, the district court held the use to be fair.
276
 
The Second Circuit disagreed, holding the use to be infringing.
277
 Tell-
ingly, the Second Circuit both analyzed fair use as an issue of fact and 
denied the defendant the opportunity to try the issue to a jury.
278
 In ef-
fect, then, the Second Circuit held that its view of fairness was not only a 
reasonable view that the trial judge did not recognize, but also one that a 
reasonable jury could not disagree with.
279
 Putting aside the merits of the 
question of fairness, the procedural implication of the court’s denial of 
the jury trial is that the trial judge’s view was entirely unreasonable. So 
whether we believe the appellate court (and accordingly doubt the trial) 
or believe the trial court (and accordingly doubt the appellate court), we 
can infer from the procedural holding that judges are not always accurate 
at assessing the views of a reasonable jury. Kirkwood demonstrates judi-
cial incompetence at determining what a jury would consider to be an 
unreasonable view. 
In the face of uncertainty surrounding the competency of judges at 
deciding fair use, it is advisable to preserve the opportunity for defend-
ants to have a jury decide the issue. So even when a judge believes that 
no reasonable jury could find a defendant’s use to be fair, the subjective-
ly and socially contested nature of the issue merits jury consideration. 
Especially in the context of fair use does the necessity for jury considera-
tion become evident. Views of fairness often are held in the extremity. 
Fairness turns on social value judgments that vary with extremity from 
person to person, so opinions on whether a use is fair may vary as widely 
as the disparity of life experiences between very different people. It ap-
  
 271. Id. at 1241–44. 
 272. See Snow, supra note 1, at 501–03 (analyzing Clean Flicks). 
 273. Id. at 502–03. 
 274. 150 F.3d 104 (2d Cir. 1998). 
 275. Id. at 106. 
 276. Infinity Broad. Corp. v. Kirkwood, 965 F. Supp. 553, 561 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). 
 277. Infinity, 150 F.3d at 104. 
 278. Id. at 106, 111–12 (implicitly recognizing the factual nature of the fair-use question by 
relying on the burden of proof as a basis to determine the issue). 
 279. See id. 
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pears ill advisable, then, for a trial judge to rule as a matter of law on the 
basis that no reasonable jury would find a use to be fair.
280
  
2. A Narrow Exception to the Prohibition  
This one-sided application of summary judgment in favor of fair us-
ers is not without qualification. An absolute prohibition of summary 
judgment to copyright holders would result in defendants asserting fair 
use, even where it was not arguable, simply as a litigation strategy to 
prolong a final verdict. And where the facts indicate infringement to the 
extent that a fair use claim is not even colorable, prolonging the obvious 
verdict would not seem to serve any interests of a protected speaker.
281
 It 
would seem, then, that those instances of infringement that are blatantly 
obvious should not inhibit a copyright holder’s ability to enforce his 
property rights to the same extent as instances where fair use is at least 
arguable. Copyright holders should incur a lower cost to enforce rights 
against blatant infringers than against arguable fair users.
282
  
Yet because subjective views of a judge color the framework 
through which she views the fair-use inferences, the standard for deter-
mining blatant infringement must be high—something more than reason-
ableness. It should be requisite, then, that a judge deem a defendant’s 
fair-use argument to be frivolous—not merely unreasonable—before 
granting a copyright holder’s motion for summary judgment. Such a 
  
 280. Removing fair-use issues from summary judgment consideration would not be unfamiliar 
to the law. See Herzog v. Castle Rock Entm’t, 193 F.3d 1241, 1247 (11th Cir. 1999) (“Summary 
judgment historically has been withheld in copyright cases because courts have been reluctant to 
make subjective determinations . . . .”). Other areas of the law deny the application of Rule 50(a) and 
Rule 56 owing to the subjectivity of a particular issue. For instance, issues relating to a defendant’s 
state of mind or the reasonableness of a defendant’s conduct are often held to be inappropriate for 
summary judgment. See Braxton-Secret v. A.H. Robins Co., 769 F.2d 528, 531 (9th Cir.1985) 
(“Questions involving a person’s state of mind . . . are generally factual issues inappropriate for 
resolution by summary judgment.” (citation omitted)); Gauck v. Meleski, 346 F.2d 433, 437 (5th 
Cir. 1965) (“Because of the peculiarly elusive nature of the term ‘negligence’ and the necessity that 
the trier of facts pass upon the reasonableness of the conduct in all the circumstances in determining 
whether it constitutes negligence, it is the rare personal injury case which can be disposed of by 
summary judgment, even where the historical facts are concededly undisputed.”).  
  Of course this position does not imply that a trial court should not rule as a matter of law 
based on the doctrine of independent review—for fair users. See discussion supra Part III.A. That 
the court is ill equipped to opine on the views of a reasonable jury does not imply that the court is ill 
equipped to opine its own views on a constitutional fact. For ruling as a matter of law on the basis of 
its obligation to protect a constitutional right enables a court to rule for a fair user independent of 
whether the court believes that a reasonable jury could rule otherwise. Hence, precluding a court 
from ruling as a matter of law under the no-reasonable jury standard should not preclude that court 
from ruling as a matter of law under the independent-review standard. Courts, then, should refrain 
from entertaining motions for summary judgment by copyright holders, whereas they should enter-
tain those motions by fair users. 
 281. Consider a defendant who has copied verbatim a plaintiff’s creative work of fiction for the 
sole purpose of selling unauthorized copies in competition with the author’s work, where no differ-
ence exists between the copyrighted work and the unauthorized copies. In such a situation, it appears 
that no inferences can in good faith be drawn to support a finding of fairness.  
 282. See Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468, 470 (2d Cir. 1946) (rejecting summary judg-
ment where there is “the slightest doubt as to the facts” but recognizing that “there are cases in 
which a trial would be farcical.” (citations omitted)). 
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standard would mean that a defendant could defeat a copyright holder’s 
motion for summary judgment merely by making a fair use argument in 
good faith. The good-faith standard would protect fair users from the 
subjective views of judges.  
C. Precedent for One-Sided Summary Judgment  
This proposal that summary judgment be available for only fair us-
ers merely restores the law to its proper state. Indeed, one-sided applica-
tion of summary judgment for fair users is not without precedent. When 
the Second Circuit initially began treating fair use cases on summary 
judgment, it employed language suggesting this: “Admittedly, the fair 
use determination often requires a complex and subtle evaluation of nu-
merous mixed issues of fact and law. When the law requires a judgment 
for defendant, however, the difficulty of the fair use question is not a 
valid reason to shy away from summary judgment.”
283
 
The reason that summary judgment was proper, according to the 
court, was because the law required judgment for the fair user. This sug-
gests, then, that if the law seemed to require judgment for the copyright 
holder, summary judgment would not be proper.  
Relatedly, on the issue of substantial similarity in copyright suits, 
courts will rule for defendants but are reluctant to rule for copyright 
holders.
284
 Like fair use, the issue of whether two works are substantially 
  
 283. Maxtone-Graham v. Burtchaell, 803 F.2d 1253, 1258–59 (2d Cir. 1986) (“This court, 
however, has never suggested the adoption of a per se rule granting a plaintiff in a copyright in-
fringement case immunity from the perils of Rule 56 when a defendant interposes the defense of fair 
use.”) (emphasis added). See also Steinberg v. Columbia Pictures Indus., 663 F. Supp. 706, 709 
(S.D.N.Y. 1987) (deciding fair use for fair user on summary judgment on grounds that “this circuit 
has ‘recognized that a court may determine non-infringement as a matter of law on a motion for 
summary judgment.’” (quoting Warner Bros. v. Am. Broad. Cos., 720 F.2d 905, 918 (2d Cir. 
1980))).  
 284. The Second Circuit recently explained that a trial court may determine the factual ques-
tion of substantial similarity on a defendant’s motion to dismiss:  
[B]ecause the question of substantial similarity typically presents an extremely close 
question of fact, questions of non-infringement have traditionally been reserved for the 
trier of fact. . . . The question of substantial similarity is by no means exclusively re-
served for resolution by a jury, however, and we have repeatedly recognized that, in cer-
tain circumstances, it is entirely appropriate for a district court to resolve that question as 
a matter of law, “either because the similarity between two works concerns only non-
copyrightable elements of the plaintiff’s work, or because no reasonable jury, properly 
instructed, could find that the two works are substantially similar.” 
Peter F. Gaito Architecture, LLC v. Simone Dev. Corp., 602 F.3d 57, 63 (2d Cir. 2010) (citations 
omitted); see also, e.g., Benay v. Warner Bros. Entm’t, Inc., 607 F.3d 620, 624 (9th Cir. 2010) 
(“When the issue is whether two works are substantially similar, summary judgment is appropriate if 
no reasonable juror could find substantial similarity of ideas and expression. Substantial similarity is 
a fact-specific inquiry, but it may often be decided as a matter of law. Indeed, we have frequently 
affirmed summary judgment in favor of copyright defendants on the issue of substantial similarity.” 
(emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Jones v. Blige, 558 F.3d 485, 490 (6th Cir. 
2009) (“In copyright infringement cases, . . . ‘a court may compare the two works and render a 
judgment for the defendant on the ground that as a matter of law a trier of fact would not be permit-
ted to find substantial similarity.’” (quoting Kohus v. Mariol, 328 F.3d 848, 853 (6th Cir. 2003)) 
(emphasis added)); cf. Segrets, Inc. v. Gillman Kintwear Co., 207 F.3d 56, 61–62 (1st Cir. 2000) 
 
File: SNOW_FINAL_To_Darby-4.doc Created on: 5/2/2012 6:00:00 PM Last Printed: 5/23/2012 7:23:00 PM 
2011] FAIR USE AS A MATTER OF LAW 45 
 
similar raises questions over which reasonable minds often disagree 
(even as to whether a contrary view is reasonable).
285
 Only where two 
works are “virtually identical” do courts summarily rule for a copyright 
holder on the issue of substantial similarity;
286
 by contrast, on the same 




Other speech contexts outside of copyright that involve subjective 
fact determinations employ summary judgment only for the defendant-
speaker.
288
 Consider defamation. As in the doctrine of fair use, in defa-
mation, a defendant’s speech rights turn on a subjective factfinding pro-
cess: the fact-finder must determine a defamation defendant’s intent.
289
 
In view of this subjective factfinding process, in defamation suits courts 
have recognized the threat of summary judgment to speech.
290
 As a re-
sult, courts rarely, if ever, entertain motions for summary judgment 
against a defamation defendant: the obviousness of the conclusion that 
such issues are best left to a jury has resulted in a dearth of summary 
judgment motions by plaintiffs. Nevertheless, given the speech at issue in 
defamation actions, courts have recognized the importance of summary 
judgments for defamation defendants.
291
 Never willing to entertain sum-
  
(affirming grant of summary judgment for copyright holder on issue of substantial similarity given 
that the defendant’s work constituted “a virtually identical copy”). 
 285. See Baby Buddies, Inc. v. Toys “R” Us, Inc., 611 F.3d 1308, 1316 (11th Cir. 2010) (af-
firming grant of summary judgment for defendant in copyright suit, but recognizing that on the issue 
of substantial similarity “lists of similarities are inherently subjective and unreliable, particularly 
where the lists contain random similarities, and many such similarities could be found in very dis-
similar works.” (quoting Corwin v. Walt Disney Co., 475 F.3d 1239, 1251 (11th Cir. 2007)). 
 286. See Segrets, 602 F.3d at 61–62. 
 287. See, e.g., Snow, supra note 1, at 502. 
 288. Compare Jartech, Inc. v. Clancy, 666 F.2d 403, 408 (9th Cir. 1982) (“[T]he [City] Coun-
cil’s request that the movies be found obscene as a matter of law flies in the face of settled Supreme 
Court case law which unquestionably establishes this as a factual determination.”), with Jacobellis v. 
Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 187–88 (1964) (ruling for defendant as a matter of law, and rejecting argument 
that “the determination whether a particular motion picture, book, or other work of expression is 
obscene can be treated as a purely factual judgment on which a jury’s verdict is all but conclusive” 
on grounds that “the question whether a particular work is obscene necessarily implicates an issue of 
constitutional law”). 
 289. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964). 
 290. See Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 120 n.9 (1979) (questioning whether deciding 
defamation on summary judgment is appropriate, given that decision requires ruling on actual mal-
ice).  
 291. See, e.g., DeAngelis v. Hill, 847 A.2d 1261, 1267 (N.J. 2004) (“This Court has recognized 
that ‘summary judgment practice is particularly well-suited for the determination of libel [and defa-
mation] actions’ because those actions tend to inhibit comment on matters of public concern.” (alter-
ation in original) (quoting Dairy Stores, Inc. v. Sentinel Publ’g Co., 516 A.2d 220, 236 (1986))); see 
also Sipple v. Chronicle Publ’g Co., 201 Cal. Rptr. 665, 673 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984) (“[A] motion for 
summary judgment in First Amendment cases is an approved procedure because unnecessarily 
protracted litigation would have a chilling effect upon the exercise of First Amendment rights and 
because speedy resolution of cases involving free speech is desirable.”). The court in Oliver v. Vil-
lage Voice, Inc., declared in a defamation suit that “the granting of summary judgment may well be 
the ‘rule’ rather than the ‘exception.’” 417 F. Supp. 235, 237 (S.D.N.Y.1976) (quoting Guitar v. 
Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 396 F. Supp. 1042, 1053 (S.D.N.Y. 1975)). Later, however, Justice 
Rehnquist questioned this position, although he did not expressly overrule it. See Hutchinson, 443 
U.S. at 120 n.9. 
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mary judgment motions against defendants, courts are willing to rule on 
summary judgment for defendants. 
V. CONCLUSION 
As an issue of fact, fair use may be decided as a matter of law, but 
only where doing so serves its speech-protective function. On appeal, 
courts should defer to a jury finding that favors the fair user. Everything 
else courts should review de novo. This double standard of review is 
necessary to protect speech interests of the fair user from the already 
imbalanced landscape of the law that favors copyright holders. Adequate 
speech protection should ensure that fair users have an opportunity for 
both judge and jury to recognize the fairness of their use. For this reason, 
trial courts should decide fair use on summary judgment only if their 
ruling would find the use to be fair. The proposed double standard of 
review and one-sided application of summary judgment are necessary to 
uphold the speech protective function of fair use.  
 
